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DUE PROCESS, FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS, 

AND CONDUCT THAT SHOCKS THE 

CONSCIENCE: THE RIGHT NOT TO BE 

ENTICED OR INDUCED TO CRIME 

BY GOVERNMENT AND ITS AGENTS 

EDWARD G. MASCOLO· 
I. INTRODUCTION 
An impartial observer of the American criminal justice system 
must be fascinated by the intense interplay between the strivings for 
freedom and the demands of order. Certain truisms come readily to 
mind: There can be no liberty without order; neither, however, can 
there be permanent order without meaningful freedom for the individ­
ual. Similarly, one is reminded that an enlightened and democratic 
society, which casts its lot with the primacy of individual security and 
integrity (in short, a society dedicated to the supremacy of the rule of 
law under which the ultimate power rests with the people), demands 
that government be the servant rather than the master of the people 
and, in its dealings with individual members of society, that it act 
fairly and within a code of civilized decency. 
Tensions still exist. While decency and the spiritual nature of 
man cannot long endure in a closed society controlled by the rule of 
force, neither can freedom itself long endure in an atmosphere of fear 
and anarchy, dominated by the rule of criminal violence. When a 
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Connecticut; member of the Connecticut and District of Columbia Bars; Editor-in-Chief of 
the Connecticut Bar Journal, 1969-73; current member of the Connecticut Bar Journal 
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democratic "[s]ociety is at war with the criminal classes,") it has, in 
effect, put itself on trial. It must confront the issue as to how far it is 
prepared to defend cherished notions of fair play and a sense of justice 
without simultaneously abdicating its responsibility of self-preserva­
tion. This issue implicates the moral caliber of such a society, and will 
help to define the standards of decency that will govern its relations 
with its members.2 
It is not surprising, therefore, that methods employed in the ad­
ministration of the criminal law have generated (and inspired) intense 
debate concerning the scope of permissible or acceptable behavior by 
government in its efforts to combat the destabilizing influences of anti­
social behavior within a system of justice commited to standards of 
civilized conduct by government and its agents. In short, a free soci­
ety about to do battle with its criminal elements must be prepared to 
say how far it will permit its government to go in "fighting the good 
fight" against crime. Will that society insist upon standards of con­
duct that, while potentially offensive to "some fastidious squeamish­
ness or private sentimentalism about combatting crime too 
energetically,"3 do not "shock[] the conscience,"4 or will it sanction 
methods of law enforcement that make the government virtually indis­
tinguishable from the criminal? 
It is the thesis of this article that a society which tolerates crimi­
nal behavior and methods by its government in combatting crime is a 
society that has fatally blurred the fundamental distinction between 
the rule of law and the lawless enforcement of the criminal law, and by 
so doing, cannot long endure. S Specifically, this article will step be­
yond the Supreme Court's suggestion6 and will propose a due process7 
I. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 453 (1932)(Roberts, J., separate opinion). 
2. Cj Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438,449 (1962)(the quality of a civiliza­
tion may properly be judged by the methods employed in the enforcement of its criminal 
laws). 
3. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952). 
4. Id. 
5. Cj McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 343 (1943)("[a] democratic society, in 
which respect for the dignity of all men is central, [must] guard[ ] against the misuse of the 
law enforcement process," and must provide "safeguards ... against the dangers of the 
overzealous as well as the despotic"). 
6. See Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 497 (1976)(Brennan, Stewart, & 
Marshall, JJ., dissenting), and id. at 492-93, 494-95 & nn. 6-7 (Powell & Blackmun, JJ., 
concurring in the jUdgment); United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423,431-32 (1973)(dictum). 
7. "No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law...." U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
"[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due 
process of law...." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I. 
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defense, supplemented by principles of judicial integrity and public 
policy, against outrageous practices of government agents in the en­
forcement of the criminal laws that shock the conscience and offend 
civilized standards of conduct. 8 Further, this defense will be an abso­
lute bar to the government invoking judicial processes to secure a con­
viction of an individual against whom such methods have been 
employed. It will require the courts to close their doors to "such pros­
titution of the criminal law"9 so as "not to be made the instrument of 
wrong." 10 
This article will first review the related doctrine of entrapment 
and analyze both the subjective and objective tests for its application. 
It will demonstrate that the subjective test endorsed by a majority of 
the Supreme Court, II with its analysis focused upon the criminal pre­
disposition of an accused, is simply inadequate to protect the predis­
posed defendant against outrageous police behavior. This article will 
next explore the feasibility of a due process defense of outrageous gov­
ernment conduct and find doctrinal support for such a defense in both 
the objective test for entrapment and the equitable "clean hands" de­
fense developed by Justice Brandeis in his memorable dissent in Olm­
stead v. United States. 12 Finally, it will argue for the adoption of a due 
process defense and will show not only that the need for such a defense 
is critical for the predisposed defendant, but also that it must be recog­
nized by the courts as a moral imperative to protect government from 
the vices of its own agents and to preserve judicial integrity. In sum, 
this article will advocate the existence of an intimate relationship be­
tween the defense, on the one hand, and public policy and judicial 
integrity, on the other hand. 
II. THE DOCTRINE OF ENTRAPMENT 
The term "entrapment" signifies "instigation of crime by officers 
8. This defense of due process, while related to entrapment, is independent of the 
principles applicable to the latter doctrine. See United States v. Lomas, 706 F.2d 886, 891 
(9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied sub nom. Margolis v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 720 (1984); see 
also United States v. Lue, 498 F.2d 531, 534 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1031 (1974). 
9. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 457 (1932) (Roberts, J., separate opinion). 
10. Id. at 456. 
II. See Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 488-90 (1976)(plurality opinion of 
Rehnquist, Burger, & White, n.); id. at 492 n.2 (Powell & Blackmun, n., concurring in the 
judgment); United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 433-36 (1973)(5-4 decision); Sherman v. 
United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372-73 (1958)(5-4 decision on appropriate relation test to be 
applied); Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 441-42, 448, 451-52 (1932)(5-3 decision on 
issue of appropriate test). 
12. 277 U.S. 438, 471, 483-85 (1928)(Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
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of government." 13 It has been defined as "the conception and planning 
of an offense by an officer [of the law], and his procurement of its 
commission by one who would not have perpetrated it except for the 
trickery, persuasion, or fraud of the officer."14 Thus, entrapment "oc­
curs only when the criminal conduct was 'the product of the creative 
activity' of law-enforcement officials."15 
Because entrapment implicates government and its agents in 
criminal activity, it is a concept which lends itself to controversy l6 and 
is appealing to defendants as a defense to criminal prosecution. The 
"Abscam" cases l7 and the celebrated trial of John DeLorean are re­
cent examples of the intense litigation generated by entrapment. 
In addition, the Supreme Court has "sharply divided" over "the 
meaning, purpose, and application of entrapment in criminal 
cases...."18 Much of this division has centered on whether the con­
trolling standard for the defense of entrapment focuses on the conduct 
of law enforcement officers (the objective test) or the predisposition of 
the defendant to commit the offense of which he stands charged (the 
sUbjective test).19 
The subjective test for entrapment, espoused by a majority of the 
Supreme Court,20 requires a two-pronged inquiry. First, a court must 
determine whether the government agents induced the defendant to 
commit the crime in question. If the court so finds, 2I it must then 
13. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 453 (1932)(Roberts, J., separate opinion). 
14. Id. at 454; see Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372 (1958); United States 
v. Taveiman, 650 F.2d 1133, 1139 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 939 (1982); State 
v. Marquardt, 139 Conn. 1, 4, 89 A.2d 219, 221 (1952)("entrapment" constitutes the in­
ducement, by government, of an individual to commit a criminal offense, not contemplated 
by him, for the purpose of prosecution). 
15. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372 (1958)(emphasis in the origi­
nal)(quoting Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 451 (1932». 
16. See, e.g., 35 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 2367, 2367-69 (Aug. 22, 1984). 
17. United States v. Kelly, 707 F.2d 1460 (D.C. Cir.)(per curiam), cert. denied, 104 
S. Ct. 264 (1983); United States v. Williams, 705 F.2d 603 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 
524 (1983); United States v. Myers, 692 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1982)(Myers II), cert. denied, 103 
S. Ct. 2438 (1983); United States v. Alexandro, 675 F.2d 34 (2d Cir.), cerr. denied, 459 U.S. 
835 (1982); United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578 (3d Cir.)(en bane), cert. denied, 457 
U.S. 1106 (1982). 
18. United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578, 596 (3d Cir.)(en bane), cert. denied, 457 
U.S. 1106 (1982). 
19. Id.; see Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 488-89 (1976)(plurality opin­
ion); United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 428-30 (1973); Sherman v. United States, 356 
U.S. 369, 372-73, 376-78 (1958); id. at 382-84 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the result); 
Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435,441-42,451 (1932); id. at 458-59 (Roberts, J., sepa­
rate opinion); see also Russell, 411 U.S. at 433-36. 
20. See cases cited supra note 11. 
21. The defendant carries the burden of persuasion on this issue, United States v. 
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make a subjective inquiry into the defendant's predisposition to com­
mit the offense.22 This latter inquiry is crucial under the subjective 
test. If a finding of predisposition is made?3 the defense will fail24 
regardless of the degree and kind of misconduct perpetrated by the 
government agents. 25 
Mayo, 705 F.2d 62, 67 (2d Cir. 1983)(burden satisfied by defendant showing "that govern­
ment initiated the crime"); United States v. Sherman, 200 F.2d 880, 882 (2d Cir. 1952), by 
a fair perponderance of the evidence. United States v. Steinberg, 551 F.2d 510, 513 (2d Cir. 
1977); United States v. Braver, 450 F.2d 799,801-03 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 
1064 (1972); see W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 48, at 373 
n.28 (1972)(it is generally required that the defendant has the burden of establishing the 
facts constituting entrapment by a preponderance of the evidence). Although the subjec­
tive analysis focuses on the defendant's propensity for crime, rather than on the conduct of 
the police, both factors have been assessed in determining whether entrapment appears 
from the evidence. See. e.g., United States v. Garcia, 546 F.2d 6\3, 615 (5th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 430 U.S. 958 (1977); see also Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435,451 (1932). 
22. See Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 489-90 (1976)(plurality opinion); 
United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 435-36 (1973); Sorrells V. United States, 287 U.S. 
435,451-52 (1932); United States v. Sherman, 200 F.2d 880, 882 (2d Cir. 1952); Note, Due 
Process Defense when Government Agents Instigate and Abet Crime, 67 GEO. L.J. 1455, 
1457 (1979). 
23. Here, the government has the burden of proof, United States v. Mayo, 705 F.2d 
62, 67 (2d Cir. 1983); United States v. Sherman, 200 F.2d 880, 882-83 (2d Cir. 1952), 
beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Jones, 575 F.2d 81, 83 (6th Cir. 1978); United 
States v. Steinberg, 551 F.2d 510, 514 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. Braver, 450 F.2d 799, 
801-03 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1064 (1972); Commonwealth v. Shuman, 391 
Mass. 345, 351, 462 N.E.2d 80, 84 (1984); see United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578,597 
(3d Cir.)(en banc)(the government must disprove the entrapment defense beyond a reason­
able doubt), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1106 (1982); see also Kadis v. United States, 373 F.2d 
370, 373 (1st Cir. 1967)(appearing to endorse standard for predisposition). 
Once entrapment has been properly raised, it may be rebutted only by proof of actual 
predisposition, and not by reasonable cause to suspect criminal involvement on the part of 
the accused. The reasonable suspicion doctrine poses the threat of convicting an otherwise 
innocent person who has been harassed into crime, thereby deflecting the Sorrells-endorsed 
inquiry, see Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 451 (1932), into the culpability of the 
defendant. Park, The Entrapment Controversy, 60 MINN. L. REV. 163, 197-98 (1976). 
24. Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 488-90 (1976)(plurality opinion); 
United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 436 (1973); United States v. Lomas, 706 F.2d 886, 
891 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied sub nom Margolis v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 720 (1984); 
United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373, 376 (3d Cir. 1978); People v. Peppars, 140 Cal. App. 
3d 677, 685, 189 Cal. Rptr. 879, 884 (1st Dist. 1983); Note, supra note 22, at 1457; see 
Donnelly, Judicial Control of Informants. Spies. Stool Pigeons, and Agent Provocateurs, 60 
YALE L.J. 1091, 1102 (1951). 
25. See Donnelly, supra note 24, at 1102. The First Circuit has rejected the bifur­
cated analysis of inducement and predisposition as separate issues, and has adopted a more 
comprehensive and singular approach involving an examination of the ultimate issue of 
entrapment. See United States v. Annese, 631 F.2d 1041, 1047 (1st Cir. 1980); United 
States v. Rodrigues, 433 F.2d 760,761 (1st Cir. 1970), cert. denied sub nom. Rodriguez [sic] 
v. United States, 401 U.S. 943 (1971); Kadis v. United States, 373 F.2d 370, 373-74 (1st 
Cir. 1967); see also United States v. Parisi, 674 F.2d 126, 127-28 (Ist Cir. 1982). Under the 
First Circuit approach, as developed in Kadis, inducement is not treated as a separate issue. 
The First Circuit argued, in Kadis, that consideration of inducement as a separate issue 
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It is therefore apparent that under the sUbjective analysis, as de­
veloped in Sorrells v. United States,26 and reaffirmed in Sherman v. 
United States,27 entrapment arises when law enforcement officers in­
duce or lure otherwise innocent persons to the commission of crime.28 
As so framed, the defense prohibits conviction for an offense "which is 
the product of the creative activity of [government] officials."29 Thus, 
for a court to determine whether entrapment has been established, it 
must distinguish between the seduction of the innocent and the en­
snarement of the guilty.30 Accordingly, since the genesis of the de­
fense and the rationale of the subjective analysis are rooted in the 
legislative intent underlying the particular statute alleged to have been 
violated (namely, that it could not have been the intent of the legisla­
ture to enforce the statute against "persons otherwise innocent" who 
were induced by government agents to violating it),3) the focus of in­
quiry will be on the character of the defendant and his predisposition 
to commit the crime in question, and not on the offensive governmen­
tal conduct. 32 
tended to emphasize the need "to police the police" regardless of the degree of corruptibil­
ity of the defendant. 373 F.2d at 373. Such an approach, implicitly argued the court, 
would be out of step with the subjective analysis of entrapment espoused by a majority of 
the Supreme Court. As the First Circuit noted, the subjective test does not distinguish 
"between the issues of inducement and predisposition," nor does it condemn "the act of 
inducement apart from its effect on an innocent man." Id. at 374 (footnote omit­
ted)(emphasis added). 
With all due respect to the First Circuit, bifurcating the analysis of entrapment does 
not minimize the significance of predisposition. If a defendant cannot establish induce­
ment, there is simply no need for the court to consider predisposition. The inquiry will end 
here, and the defense of entrapment will fail. Hence, it is both prudent and practical for a 
court to bifurcate the analysis of inducement and predisposition under the subjective ap­
proach to entrapment and to require a defendant who raises the issue of entrapment to 
satisfy the threshold inquiry of inducement. See Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 
372-73 (1958); Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 451 (1932). 
26. 287 U.S. 435 (1932). 
27. 356 U.S. 369 (1958). 
28. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 435-36 (1973); Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 448, 
451-52. 
29. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 451. 
30. See Sherman, 356 U.S. at 372. 
31. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 448-49, 452; accord, United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 
435 (1973); Sherman, 356 U.S. at 372; United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578, 607 (3d 
Cir.)(en banc), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1106 (1982); see Comment, The Viability of the En­
trapment Defense in the Constitutional Context, 59 IOWA L. REV. 655, 655-56 (1974). 
32. See Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 488-89 (1976)(plurality opinion); 
Sherman, 356 U.S. at 372-73; Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 441-42, 451; see also Note, supra note 22, 
at 1467-68 (since predisposition is a crucial issue in entrapment cases, and fatal, upon 
proof, to the defense, the prosecution can defeat a claim of entrapment without establishing 
the reasonableness of the governmental conduct). The Supreme Court remains committed 
to this approach. See Hampton, 425 U.S. at 488-90 (plurality opinion); United States v. 
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The objective test for entrapment, as articulated by Justice Rob­
erts in Sorrells v. United States,33 and by Justice Frankfurter in Sher­
man v. United States,34 rejects the legislative-intent rationale of the 
sUbjective analysis with emphasis placed upon the defendant's crimi­
nal predisposition. They target the extent of governmental miscon­
duct as the focal point of its inquiry.35 As Justice Frankfurter 
critically observed in Sherman, a criminal statute is concerned exclu­
sively with the definition and prohibition of certain conduct, not with 
legislative concepts of standards of decency for police conduct in the 
detection of criminal activity.36 Moreover, Justice Frankfurter indi­
cated that seeking statutory guidance in the application of a fictitious 
legislative intent would "distort analysis" and would result in the abdi­
cation of judicial responsibility, in the face of legislative silence, "to 
accommodate the dangers of overzealous law enforcement and civi­
lized methods adequate to counter the ingenuity of modern 
criminals." 3 7 
Justice Frankfurter also feared that emphasizing criminal predis­
position would unnecessarily expose the defendant to juror prejudice. 
He noted that the government, in order to prove that it had not en­
trapped the accused, would be compelled to demonstrate a general 
predisposition on his part "to commit, whenever the opportunity 
should arise, crimes of the kind solicited ...."38 Such proof, Justice 
Frankfurter observed, will frequently involve evidence of reputation, 
prior disposition, and other criminal conduct. 39 He argued, however, 
that this situation was pregnant with danger if the issue of entrapment 
were submitted to a jury, for then the defendant would run "the sub­
stantial risk that, in spite of instructions," the jury would be influenced 
by "a criminal record or bad reputation" in assessing the ultimate is­
sue of guilt or innocence.4O 
Justice Roberts, in his separate opinion in Sorrells, also objected 
to the method of statutory interpretation employed by the Sorrells ma-
Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 428-30, 433-36 (1973)(5-4 decision)(reaffirrning the subjective test 
and declining to overrule Sorrells and Sherman). 
33. 287 U.S. 435, 453 (1932)(Roberts, J., separate opinion). 
34. 356 U.S. 369, 378 (1958)(Frankfurter, J., concurring in the result). 
35. Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 488-89 (1976)(plurality opinion); see 
United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 428-30 (1973); Sherman 356 U.S. at 382-84 (Frank­
furter, J., concurring in the result); Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 458-59 (Roberts, J., separate opin­
ion); see a/so Russell, 411 U.S. at 433-36. 
36. Sherman, 356 U.S. at 381 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the result). 
37. Id. 
38. Id. at 382. 
39. Id. 
40. Id. 
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jority, in that the behavior of the accused fell within the terms of the 
applicable statute.41 In addition, he accused the majority of establish­
ing no criteria for determining when a statute should be read as ex­
cluding cases of entrapment.42 
More fundamentally, however, the difference between the subjec­
tive and objective tests for entrapment is one of theory. To endow the 
doctrine of entrapment with a statutory premise is to lose sight of its 
underlying function, which is to deny punishment for one who, while 
not in any legal sense innocent, has been enticed or induced to crime 
by law enforcement methods that fall below acceptable standards of 
conduct. It is for this reason that the proponents of the objective test 
have argued that it is the duty of the courts to close their doors to 
prosecutions founded on government-manufactured crimes.43 
Although the legislative-intent rationale of the SUbjective ap­
proach to entrapment has deprived the doctrine of a constitutional 
footing44 and has tended to limit its scope,45 the doctrine, even in 
shrunken form, retains its vitality as a means of deterring improper 
law enforcement practices.46 It involves the unjust procurement of 
crime by government agents,47 and preserves the integrity of the 
courts and of the criminal justice system.48 The doctrine articulates a 
philosophy of law that rejects punishment for one who has been in­
duced by government agents to engage in criminal activity.49 The de­
fense that it affords is available, not as a vehicle for freeing the guilty, 
but as a means of prohibiting the prosecution and conviction of indi­
viduals for criminal conduct instigated and procured by government 
agents.50 Strictly speaking, entrapment is, therefore, neither a defense 
41. Sorrel/s, 287 U.S. at 456 (Roberts, J., separate opinion). 
42. Id. at 456-57. 
43. Sherman, 356 U.S. at 380-84 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the result); Sorrel/s, 
287 U.S. at 455-59 (Roberts, J., separate opinion). 
44. See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 433 (1973)(since the defense of en­
trapment "is not of a constitutional dimension," Congress may properly "adopt any sub­
stantive definition of the defense that it may find desirable" (footnote omited». 
45. See id. at 435. 
46. For a discussion of the deterrence rationale of entrapment, see MODEL PENAL 
CODE § 2.10 commentary at 14 (Tent. Draft No.9, 1959); W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTI, supra 
note 21, § 48, at 372; Park, supra note 23, at 242. 
47. G. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART § 256, at 785 (2d ed. 
1961). 
48. Park, supra note 23, at 242; see United States v. Demma, 523 F.2d 981, 985 (9th 
Cir. 1975)(en banc); Donnelly, supra note 24, at 1112; Note, supra note 22, at 1456-57. 
49. See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 435 (1973); Sorrel/s, 287 U.S. at 452. 
50. See Sherman, 356 U.S. at 380 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the result); Sorrel/s, 
287 U.S. at 452; MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 46, § 2.10 commentary at 14-15. 
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nor an excuse for crime in any conventional legal sense. 51 This has 
prompted one court to observe that rather than being perceived as a 
defense, entrapment should be "treated as a fact inconsistent with 
guilt."52 While law enforcement conduct is not in any strictly techni­
cal sense a legal defense under the principles of entrapment, and can­
not excuse a criminal offense, "it does not follow that the court must 
suffer a detective-made criminal to be punished."53 Such a result 
would be beyond any conceivable legislative intent in enacting the stat­
ute or statutes alleged to have been violated by the defendant. 54 The 
issue of entrapment, as framed, is not concerned with the judicial 
power over the admission and exclusion of evidence.55 The doctrine 
implicates the power to release an accused who has committed a crim­
inal offense. 56 The power of clemency, however, may be exercised 
only by the executive branch of government.57 Thus, the doctrine ap­
pears to be rooted in an ethical and social judgement. When society, 
through its law enforcement officers, has instigated and caused an indi­
vidual's action or behavior, it is unjust for that society to insist upon 
punishment for such conduct. 58 
It follows, therefore, that the crucial issue raised by the doctrine 
of entrapment "is not whether the particular offense was brought 
about by the government agent, but rather whether the government 
agent brought about the defendant's predisposition to crime."59 It is 
precisely because of the limiting scope of this inquiry, with its focus 
upon "the defendant's predisposition to crime," however, that the 
predisposed defendant is particularly vulnerable to outrageous acts of 
misconduct by the police in their zeal to ferret out criminals. But, as 
the subjective rationale teaches, he may not invoke the aid of the prin­
ciples of entrapment. A finding of predisposition is fatal to a claim of 
51. See Sorrel/s, 287 U.S. at 456 (Roberts. J., separate opinion); Casey v. United 
States, 276 U.S. 413, 423 (I928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
52. State v. Whitney, 157 Conn. 133, 135,249 A.2d 238, 239 (1968); see McCarroll 
v. State, 294 Ala. 87, 88, 312 So. 2d 382, 383 (1975) (defense of entrapment "rests on the 
defendant's admitting the deed but disclaiming the thought"); see also United States v. 
Licursi, 525 F.2d 1164, 1169 n.5 (2d Cir. 1975) (the court, in dictum, appeared to recognize 
that invoking the doctrine of entrapment concedes the commission of the offense charged). 
53. Casey v. United States, 276 U.S. 413, 423 (1928)(Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
54. See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423,435 (1973); Sherman, 356 U.S. at 372; 
Sorrel/s, 287 U.S. at 448-49, 452. 
55. Note, Entrapment, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1333, 1334 (1960). 
56. Id. 
57. See Sorrel/s, 287 U.S. at 449; Ex parte United States, 242 U.S. 27, 42 (1916)(the 
"right to relieve" from punishment rests with the executive). 
58. See Note, supra note 55, at 1335. 
59. Commonwealth v. Shuman, 391 Mass. 345, 351,462 N.E.2d 80,83 (1984)(em­
phasis added). 
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entrapment.6O It is here that the need for a new and more broadly­
perceived concept of deterrence is particularly pressing. That need is 
twofold: to protect all citizens, including predisposed individuals and 
those only suspected of criminal predisposition, from unscrupulous 
law enforcement officials; and to devise a national standard proscrib­
ing police practices that shock the conscience and offend one's sense of 
justice. Hence, it is necessary for a due process defense based upon 
outrageous governmental conduct to fully satisfy the above criteria.61 
III. THE RIGHT To A DUE PROCESS DEFENSE 
A. Introductory Comments 
The argument concerning the feasibility, or desirability, of plac­
ing a due process limitation upon the degree and scope of police in­
volvement in crime, is not truly an argument about law enforcement. 
Rather, it is an argument about government, and more specifically, the 
role and quality of government in a free society. If we have learned 
anything about the relationship between government and its citizens 
since the founding of this nation, it is that the options available to any 
society are limited, either to a community in which government is the 
servant of the people or to a state in which the interests of the individ­
ual are subordinated to the will and power of arbitrary government. 
The choice is stark, but clear-cut. It will tell us much about the qual­
ity of such a civilization. 
Nowhere is this choice more sharply defined than in the adminis­
tration of the criminal law, "that most awesome aspect of govern­
ment. . . "62 It is to this subject that the thrust of this article is 
directed. This article attempts to demonstrate that the quality of a 
60. See authorities cited supra note 24. 
61. Although the defense of entrapment is not availvable to a predisposed defendant, 
a separate due process defense, based solely upon governmental misconduct, may be in­
voked by any person accused of crime. See United States v. Kaminski, 703 F.2d 1004, 1007 
(7th Cir. 1983); United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373, 378-79 (3d Cir. 1978); Greene v. 
United States, 454 F.2d 783, 786-87 (9th Cir. 1971); People v. Isaacson, 44 N.Y.2d 511, 
518-19, 523-24, 378 N.E.2d 78, 81,84-85,406 N.Y.S.2d 714, 717, 721 (1978); see also 
United States v. Wylie, 625 F.2d 1371, 1377-79 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied sub nom. Per­
luss V. United States, 449 U.S. 1080 (1981)(entertaining, but rejecting, a claim of due pro­
cess deprivation from predisposed defendants, without specifically endorsing criteria for 
standing); Greene, 454 F.2d at 786-87 (entertaining, and sustaining, a claim of due process 
deprivation from predisposed defendants, without specifically endorsing criteria for stand­
ing); State V. Hohensee, 650 S.W.2d 268, 270-74 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982)(same). This latter 
defense has been accorded constitutional status. United States V. Beverly, 723 F.2d II, 12 
(3d Cir. 1983)(per curiam); see United States V. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578, 608 (3d Cir.)(en 
banc), cerE. denied, 457 U.S. 1106 (1982). 
62. Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 356 (1946)(Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
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civilization is properly judged by the methods employed in the en­
forcement of its criminal laws, 63 and that the quality of such methods 
must be measured against the standards of fundamental fairness under 
the rubric of due process. Although the concept of due process does 
not lend itself to rigid analysis, its ability to adapt to changing circum­
stances and to incorporate the accumulated wisdom of experience,64 
makes it ideally suited to the task of defining, in terms of concrete 
examples, the permissible limits of law enforcement involvement in the 
detection of crime and the apprehension of criminals. The experience 
may not always lend itself to easy and simple resolution, but a free 
society dare not shirk its responsibility to make the necessary commit­
ment to controlling the awesome police power of the state. 
B. The Concept of Due Process 
The American system of criminal justice, with its emphasis upon 
accusatorial proceedings governed by the presumption of innocence,65 
the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination,66 and the require­
ment of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,67 has sought "to balance the 
scales in the contest between government and citizen. "68 One of the 
key elements in this endeavor is the concept of substantive due pro­
cess, with its emphasis upon fundamental fairness69 and civilized de­
cency70 by government in its dealings with the individual. 
Due process is not cast in a rigid mold. It embodies a concept 
that has evolved historically. It is neither fixed nor finaJ.71 In short, 
due process "is not a technical conception with a fixed content unre­
63. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 449 (1962). 
64. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169-72 (1952); Joint Anti-Fascist Refu­
gee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162-63, 174 (1951)(Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
65. See Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 483-86 (1978). 
66. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966); Tehan v. United States ex. rei. 
Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 414-15 & n.12 (1966); Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 
(1964); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1,7 (1964); Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 540-41 
(1961). 
67. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423-24 (1979); Patterson v. New York, 432 
U.S. 197,210 (1977); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). 
68. Mascolo, Procedural Due Process and the Right to Appointed Counsel in Civil 
Contempt Proceedings, 5 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 601, 628 (1983)(footnote omitted); see 
Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964)(one of the "fundamental values" 
that the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination implements is "our sense of fair 
play which dictates" a fair balance in the contest between the state and the individual); 8 J. 
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2251, at 317-18 (J. McNaughton rev. 1961). 
69. See Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 494 n.6 (1976)(Powell, J., concur­
ring in the judgment); Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 487 n.15 (1978). 
70. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173 (1952). 
71. Id. at 168-72; see Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 24-25 
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lated to time, place and circumstances."72 Rather, it represents "a 
summarized constitutional guarantee of respect for those personal im­
munities" which are "fundamental" and "implicit in the concept of 
ordered liberty. "73 
Justice Frankfurter has described due process as a legal concept 
in these terms: "Due process is perhaps the most majestic concept in 
our whole constitutional system. While it contains the garnered wis­
dom of the past in assuring fundamental justice, it is also a living prin­
ciple not confined to past instances."74 Many attempts have been 
made to precisely define this "most majestic concept." The attempts 
have proved to be somewhat unsuccessful,75 primarily because of the 
"vague contours"76 and comprehensive scope of due process. 77 What 
can be distilled from these efforts, however, is that the essence of due 
process is "an abiding sense of fundamental fairness in the relations 
between government and citizen, "78 and "the sense of fair 
play...."79 
The meaning of "fundamental fairness," which extends to the in­
dividual the "most comprehensive protection of liberties,"80 and em­
braces a noble ideal, "can be as opaque as its importance is lofty."81 
Applying due process "is therefore an uncertain enterprise which must 
discover what 'fundamental fairness' consists of in a particular situa­
tion"82 by scrutinizing all of the circumstances83 in light of relevant 
(1981); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,334 (1976); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. 
v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162-63, 174 (l951)(Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
72. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162 (1951)(Frank­
furter, J., concurring); accord, Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 24 
(1981); Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 
(1961). 
73. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952)(quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 
291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934), and Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319,325 (1937». 
74. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 174 (1951)(Frank­
furter, J., concurring)(emphasis added). 
75. See Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 24 (1981). 
76. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165,170 (1952). 
77. See id. 
78. Mascolo, supra note 68, at 612; see Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34-35 
(1982); Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18,24 (1981); Taylor v. Kentucky, 
436 U.S. 478, 487 n.15 (1978); Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 494 n.6 (1976) 
(Powell, J., concurring in the jUdgment); Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 563-64 (1967); 
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162-63 (1951)(Frankfurter, 
J., concurring); Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219,236 (1941). 
79. Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530 (1954). 
80. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 170 (1952). 
81. Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18,24 (1981). 
82. Id. at 24-25. 
83. See Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 494-95 n.6 (1976)(Powell, J., con­
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precedents, and assessing the competing interests at stake.84 
Two perceptions emerge from this summarized review of the 
guiding principles of due process. First, is the trenchant commitment 
to fair play and civilized decency in the relations between the state and 
the individual. The picture is clear that due process "is not a fair­
weather or timid assurance"85 to the individual in his insistence upon 
freedom from arbitrary behavior and unscrupulous practices by gov­
ernment and its agents. Second, and as a follow-up to this profound 
commitment to the integrity and dignity of the individual, is the insis­
tence upon fundamentally just standards of conduct by the state in the 
event that the citizen becomes a target of a criminal investigation. 
Due process intercedes here on behalf of the individual, not to tilt the 
scales in his favor, but simply to balance the scales in any ensuing 
contest with government.86 And, it is precisely because of this com­
prehensive guarantee that due process is a particularly attractive vehi­
cle for checking government abuses in the administration of the 
criminal justice system and the enforcement of the nation's penal 
codes. Moreover, it is a concept that brings a sense of justice to crimi­
nal proceedings and a message of civilized decency and fairness to all, 
including those predisposed to crime, who deal with government. 
Thus, it provides a protection that extends beyond the subjective prin­
ciples of entrapment, with emphasis upon criminal predisposition and 
denial of security to those with such propensity.87 Ultimately, and 
most importantly, due process makes no attempt to weigh the equities 
of the respective parties. It imposes solely upon government "respect 
[for] certain decencies of civilized conduct"88 in its relations with citi­
zens, irrespective of their guilt or innocence, or criminal propensity. 
C. Analysis and Discussion 
In his memorable dissent in Olmstead v. United States,89 Justice 
Brandeis articulated an equitable "clean hands" defense to the admis­
sibility of evidence obtained by government as the result of the com­
curring in the judgment); Sherman, 356 U.S. at 384-85 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the 
result). 
84. See Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 24-25 (1981). 
85. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162 (1951)(Frank­
furter, J., concurring). 
86. See Mascolo, supra note 68, at 612-13. 
87. See supra notes 22-32 and accompanying text. 
88. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173 (1952). 
89. 277 U.S. 438, 471 (l928)(Brandeis, J., dissenting). Olmstead was overruled by 
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), on grounds unrelated to the context in which it 
is used in this article. 
14 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:1 
mission of criminal acts. Arguing that "a court will not redress a 
wrong when he who invokes its aid has unclean hands,"90 a maxim 
that, although derived from principles of equity,91 "prevails also in 
courts of law,"92 Justice Brandeis reasoned that where government is 
the offending actor and seeks the remedies of the criminal law, the 
reasons for applying the operating principle underlying the maxim 
"are compelling."93 
The "clean hands" maxim signifies that a litigant invoking the aid 
of equity has himself been guilty of unscrupulous and deceitful con­
duct violative of the fundamental concepts of equity jurisprudence. 
He therefore is refused all recognition and affirmative relief with re­
spect to the controversy at issue.94 Thus, the maxim dictates that 
whenever a plaintiff turns to equity for relief, but has been guilty of 
inequitable conduct relative to the particular controversy, the court 
will shut its doors to him in limine, and will refuse to interfere on his 
behalf by denying to him any affirmative relief. 95 
Applying the maxim to the criminal law, Justice Brandeis opined 
that the ratio decidendi of "unclean hands" dictated that legal reme­
dies would be denied to a prosecuting litigant who "has violated the 
law in connection with the very transaction as to which he seeks legal 
redress."96 The reasons for this, Justice Brandeis instructed, were "to 
maintain respect for law[,]. .. to promote confidence in the adminis­
tration ofjustice[,]. . . [and] to preserve the judicial process from con­
tamination," regardless of any wrong committed by the defendant.97 
Accordingly, the doctrine of "unclean hands" in the criminal law is a 
rule "not of action, but of inaction."98 
In addition, the rule speaks to both substantive law and matters 
of procedure.99 Hence, Justice Brandeis observed that objection to the 
government as one which "comes with unclean hands will be taken by 
90. 277 u.S. at 483 (footnote omitted). 
91. See Manufacturers' Finance Co. v. McKey, 294 U.S. 442, 451 (1935); Olmstead, 
277 U.S. at 483-84 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); 2 J. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 
§ 397, at 91, § 398, at 92-94 (S. Symons 5th ed. 1941); 27 AM. JUR. 2d Equity § 136, at 666­
67 (1966). 
92. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 484 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
93. Id. (footnote omitted)(emphasis added). 
94. 2 J. POMEROY, supra note 91, § 397, at 91; 27 AM. JUR.2d, supra note 91 § 136, 
at 667; see Manufacturers' Finance Co. v. McKey, 294 U.S. 442, 451 (1935). 
95. 2 J. POMEROY, supra note 91, § 397, at 91-92; 27 AM. JUR. 2d, supra note 91, 
§ 136, at 667; see Manufacturers' Finance Co. v. McKey, 294 U.S. 442, 451 (1935). 
96. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 484 (Brandeis, J., dissenting)(footnote omitted). 
97. Id. 
98. Id. (emphasis added). 
99. Id. at 484-85. 
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the court itself," in order that "[t]he court [might] protect[] itself."loo 
For these reasons, concluded Justice Brandeis, "[d]ecency, secur­
ity[,] and liberty alike demand that government officials shall be sub­
jected to the same rules of conduct that are commands to the 
citizen." 101 If the rule were otherwise, argued Justice Brandeis, the 
. very existence of government would be "imperilled" by its failure "to 
observe the law scrupulously."102 Furthermore, by its example as "the 
potent, the omnipresent teacher," the government, as lawbreaker, will 
breed "contempt for law" and invite anarchy.103 To Justice Brandeis, 
therefore, any attempt by government to introduce, into "the adminis­
tration of the criminal law," the doctrine that "the end justifies the 
means - to declare that the [g]overnment may commit crimes in or­
der to secure the conviction of a private criminal- would bring terri­
ble retribution." Against that "pernicious doctrine," he admonished, 
"[c]ourt[s] should resolutely set [their] face[s]."I04 
It is submitted that the doctrine of the equitable "clean hands" 
defense, as enunciated by Justice Brandeis in his Olmstead dissent, 
bears particular relevance to the due process defense of outrageous 
governmental conduct. It is consistent with the objective test for en­
trapment lOS articulated by Justice Roberts in Sorrells v. United 
States,106 and by Justice Frankfurter in Sherman v. United States. 107 
Those dissents focus on the extent of governmental misconduct rather 
than the defendant's criminal predisposition.108 Under this test, it is 
the duty of the courts to close their doors to prosecutions founded 
upon governmental misconduct involving the inducement to or the 
creation of crime. 109 
Justice Roberts argued in Sorrells that the doctrine of entrapment 
100. Id. at 485. 
101. Id. 
102. Id. 
103. Id. (emphasis added). 
104. Id. (emphasis added); see United States v. Archer, 486 F.2d 670,676-77 (2d Cir. 
1973)(dictum)("[T]here is certainly a limit to allowing governmental involvement in crime . 
. . . Governmental 'investigation' involving participation in activities that result in injury 
to the rights of its citizens is a course that courts should be extremely reluctant to sanc­
tion." (footnote omitted»; see also McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 343-47 
(1943)(courts, as custodians of liberty, should not sanction convictions obtained by meth­
ods offensive to a progressive society). 
105. See supra text accompanying notes 33-43. 
106. 287 U.S. 435, 453 (1932)(Roberts, J., separate opinion). 
107. 356 U.S. 369, 378 (1958)(Frankfurter, J., concurring in the result). 
108. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
109. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 457, 459 (Roberts, J., separate opinion); see Sherman, 356 
U.S. at 380 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the result); Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 455 (Roberts, J., 
separate opinion); Donnelly, supra note 24, at 1102, 1112. 
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must be rooted "in the public policy which protects the purity of gov­
ernment and its processes" 110 from "the consummation of a wrong" I I I 
perpetrated "by foul means," 112 and which closes the courts "to the 
trial of a crime instigated by the government's own agents."1 13 In ad­
dition, Justice Roberts reasoned that courts themselves possess "the 
inherent right ... not to be made the instrument of wrong."114 
Hence, it is the moral imperative of a court to preserve "the purity of 
its own temple" and "to protect itself and the government from such 
prostitution of the criminallaw."1 15 
Under this view of entrapment, there is no need for a distinction 
based upon the nature of the offense. I 16 Similarly, for Justice Roberts, 
the issue of entrapment is not concerned with guilt or innocence, but 
only with "the public policy which protects the purity of govern­
ment"IJ7 and the moral integrity of the judiciary.118 It may be 
brought to the attention of the court "at any stage of the case," and, if 
established, requires the court to quash the indictment and to dis­
charge the defendant. I 19 It follows, according to Justice Roberts, that 
the defendant's reputation and prior criminal activities are not legiti­
mate subjects of the inquiry. I 20 The inquiry is concerned only with the 
preservation of judicial and governmental integrity.12I Finally, ac­
cording to Justice Roberts, there is no place for balancing equities be­
tween the accused and the government, because entrapment is not to 
be condoned because of a defendant's reputation or prior transgres­
sions without disregarding "the reason for refusing the processes of 
the court to consummate an abhorrent transaction."122 
Justice Frankfurter, in Sherman, was similarly persuaded~ For 
him, an approach that focuses on the predisposition and character of 
110. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 455 (Roberts, J., separate opinion). 
111. Id. at 458. 
112. Id. at 459. 
113. Id. 
114. Id. at 456. 
115. Id. at 457. This analysis is but a reaffirmation of the position adopted by Justice 
Holmes in his dissenting opinion in Olmstead, 277 U.S. 438, 469 (1928), where he confessed 
to little, if any, distinction between government rewarding "its officers for having got evi­
dence by crime" and government "pay[ing] them for getting it in the same way ...." Id. 
at 470. In either case, government would be playing "an ignoble part." Id. 
116. See Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 455 (Roberts, J., separate opinion). 
117. Id. 
118. Id. at 457; see Casey v. United States, 276 U.S. 413, 425 (I 928)(Brandeis, I., 
dissenting); Donnelly, supra note 24, at 1112. 
119. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 457 (Roberts, I., separate opinion). 
120. Id. at 458-59. 
121. Id. at 455, 457, 458-59. 
122. Id. at 459; Donnelly, supra note 24, at 1102. 
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the accused "loses sight of the underlying reason for the defense of 
entrapment." 123 The rationale of the doctrine from Justice Frank­
furter's perspective is that regardless of the defendant's reputation or 
past record for antisocial behavior and "present inclinations to crimi­
nality, ... certain police conduct to ensnare him into further crime is 
not to be tolerated by an advanced society."124 Therefore, the police 
should not be granted a blank check, including "inordinate induce­
ments" in combatting the criminal elements of society,125 and should 
not be accorded a roving commission to induce to crime persons who 
are endeavoring to resist the temptation of such conduct. 126 
Justice Frankfurter further argued that to ensure the objective 
regulation of law enforcement conduct in apprehending "only those 
ready and willing to commit crime,"127 which would be lacking if the 
reasonableness of police conduct were evaluated in terms of the crimi­
nal predisposition of the accused, the proper focus of inquiry must be 
on the conduct of government agents. 128 For Justice Frankfurter, it 
simply was not the function of government "to promote rather than 
detect crime and to bring about the downfall of those who, left to 
themselves, might well have obeyed the law."129 In sum, Justice 
Frankfurter concluded that "[h]uman nature is weak enough and suffi­
ciently beset by temptation without government adding to them and 
generating crime."130 
Crucial to the objective test for entrapment, developed by Justice 
Roberts and Justice Frankfurter, is the recognition that the threat 
posed to the integrity of both the criminal law and the judicial 
processes lies not in the activity of the defendant, but rather in the 
conduct of the government. Hence, the proper focus of a court's in­
quiry will be on the government's activity and not on the behavior of 
the accused. 131 Moreover, the thrust of this inquiry is dictated by the 
doctrine that the judicial power should not be employed as an instru­
123. Sherman, 356 U.S. at 382 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the result). 
124. Id. at 383 (emphasis added). 
125. Id. 
126. See id. at 383-84. It should be pointed out, however, that this position partially 
overlaps the sUbjective test for entrapment, in that it appears to emphasize the lack of 
criminal predisposition. See Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 488-90 (I 976)(plural­
ity opinion); United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 433-36 (I 973)(majority opinion); Sher­
man, 356 U.S. at 372-73 (majority opinion); Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 441-42, 451 (majority 
opinion). 
127. Sherman, 356 U.S. at 384 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the result). 
128. Id. 
129. Id. 
130. Id. (emphasis added). 
131. See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 429 (1973); Sherman, 356 U.S. at 
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ment for the enforcement of the criminal law by means that are unjust. 
This is "a fundamental rule of public policy,"132 and is grounded in 
the power of the judiciary "to protect itself and the government from 
such prostitution of the criminal law." 133 The genesis of this position 
is rooted in the policy of judicial integrity.134 
Justice Brandeis, in his dissenting opinion in Casey v. United 
States,135 adopted a similar approach. He reasoned that a prosecution 
based upon entrapment should be terminated in order to protect the 
government from the illegal conduct of its agents, and to "preserve the 
purity of its courtS."136 This decision to terminate, Justice Brandeis 
believed, had nothing to do with the denial of any rights of the defend­
ant. 137 Thus, he did not place entrapment on a constitutional footing. 
As Justice Brandeis perceived the situation, the conduct of the 
government and its officers was not a defense to the defendant. For 
him, governmental misconduct could not excuse the violation of crimi­
nal statutes. 138 But it did not follow, reasoned Justice Brandeis, that a 
"court must suffer a detective-made criminal to be punished."139 To 
do so in his view would be tantamount to ratification by government 
of the misconduct of its officers. l40 This Justice Brandeis could not 
sanction. In order to protect government from the "illegal conduct of 
its officers,"141 and to "preserve the purity of its courts,"142 he would 
dismiss indictments and deny to government the use of the judicial 
process to seek convictions in cases involving official misconduct in the 
apprehension and prosecution of criminals. 143 It is apparent, there­
fore, that Justice Brandeis based his analysis of entrapment upon con­
siderations of both public policy and judicial integrity, and implicitly 
invoked the supervisory powers of courts as a means of preserving the 
382-84 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the result); Sorrel/s, 287 U.S. at 456-59 (Roberts, J., 
separate opinion). 
132. Sorrel/s, 287 U.S. at 457 (Roberts, J., separate opinion). 
133. Id. 
134. See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 445 (1973)(Stewart, J., dissenting); 
Sherman, 356 U.S. at 380, 385 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the result); Olmstead, 277 
U.S. at 483-85 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); id. at 470 (Holmes, J., dissenting); Donnelly, 
supra note 24, at 1112. 
135. 276 U.S. 413,421 (1928)(Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
136. Id. at 425. 
137. Id. 
138. Id. at 423. 
139. Id. 
140. Id. at 423-24, 425. 

14l. Id. at 425. 

142. Id. 
143. See id. at 423-25. 
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integrity of courts and deterring illegal conduct by government or im­
proper practices by the police. l44 
When government engages in the "dirty business"14s of inducing 
or manufacturing crime, it comes into court with more than unclean 
hands: it comes into court with unclean hands that have sullied and 
violated the very law that government is charged with obeying and 
protecting. The courts are similarly charged with upholding and re­
specting the law. They are also under a duty to protect their functions 
and preserve "the purity of [their] own temple[s]. ..."146 Against 
such pernicious conduct, courts "should resolutely set [their] 
face[s],"147 and firmly shut their doors. 
If the result is to free a criminal, we as a people will have the 
satisfaction of knowing that the Constitution is being vindicated, 148 for 
"it is the law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a government 
more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its disre­
gard of the charter of its own existence."149 We should not forget that 
the rule of lawlso in this country was designed to protect all of us ­
the innocent and the guilty - from rule by tyranny. lSI The choice 
may not be easy, but it is one that must be made. We live under "a 
government of laws, and not of men,"IS2 and it is the duty of all of­
ficers of government, "from the highest to the lowest," to obey the 
144. See United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 505 (l983)(purpose of supervisory 
power of courts includes preserving judicial integrity and deterring illegal conduct); United 
States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 736 n.8 (1980)("we agree that the supervisory power serves 
the 'twofold' purpose of deterring illegality and protecting judicial integrity"); United 
States v. Ramirez, 710 F.2d 535, 541 (9th Cir. 1983)(following Hasting). 
145. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 470 (Holmes, J., dissenting)(condemning the seizure of 
evidence by illegal means). 
146. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 457 (Roberts, J., separate opinion). 
147. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 485 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
148. C[ United States v. Beverly, 723 F.2d II, 13 (3d Cir. 1983)(per curiam)(while 
the police conduct in question did not reach the requisite level of outrageousness to offend 
principles of due process, the court implicitly recognized that if it had, an acquittal would 
have been compelled "so as to protect the Constitution"). 
149. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961)(emphasis added)(defending the exclu­
sion of illegally obtained evidence). 
150. Cf United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196,220 (I 882)(no man is above the law, and 
all officers of government "are bound to obey it"); see generally Marbury v. Madison, 5 
U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 163 (1803)(the United States is "a government of laws, and not of 
men"). 
151. Cf Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 357 (1931)(the 
fourth amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures "protects all, those 
suspected or known to be offenders as well as the innocent"); THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 
388-90 (A. Hamilton)(1831)(constitutional requirement of lifetime tenure for judicial of­
ficers will secure the independence of the judiciary against legislative encroachments, and 
protect the rights of the individual from majoritarian, as well as from tyrannical, excesses). 
152. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 163 (1803). 
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law.1S3 In a free and democratic society, it is a "less[er] evil that some 
criminals should escape than that the government should play an igno­
ble part."154 To hold otherwise would "breed[] contempt for [the] 
law,"155 and would reduce the Constitution to a "form of words," 156 
or worse, to a dead letter. It is not a proper office of the judiciary to 
sanction, however indirectly, the lawless enforcement of the criminal 
law, or to have any hand "in such dirty business ...."157 Nor should 
the prosecutor forget that, as a representative "of a sovereignty whose 
obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to 
govern at all,"158 his interest is to see that "justice shall be done"159 
within a legal framework of proper and legitimate methods employed 
by law enforcement officials in ferreting out crime. Although it is un­
derstandable that prosecutors and their agents will tend to attach great 
significance to the societal interest in uncovering crime and convicting 
criminals, "the danger is that they will assign too little [weight] to the 
rights of citizens to be free from government-induced criminality."I60 
We live in a society "of ordered liberty ...."161 Clearly, how­
ever, as this very concept implies, there can be no liberty without or­
der.162 Furthermore, there can be no order when the peace and 
security of society are threatened by "escalating crime in our cit­
ies,"163 and when "[s]ociety [itself] is at war with the criminal 
classes...."164 Crime is a cancer that strikes at the social fabric of 
the community, and it is a rash society indeed that is so foolhardy as 
to think that it can endure with impunity the ravages wrought by un­
checked and destructive criminal behavior. 
Our concern about the evils of crime are real and legitimate. They 
are worthy of a self-respecting people. Our concerns for the decencies 
of life and for the integrity of civilized standards governing the con­
duct of law enforcement officers combatting the criminal elements of 
society are also worthy. Justice Frankfurter has described the admin­
153. United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 220 (1882). 
154. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 470 (Holmes, J., dissenting)(emphasis added). 
155. Id. at 485 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
156. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920). 
157. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 470 (Holmes, J., dissenting); see Donnelly, supra note 24, 
at 1112. 
158. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). 
159. Id. 
160. United States v. Archer, 486 F.2d 670, 677 (2d Cir. 1973)(dictum). 
161. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319,325 (1937). 
162. See Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574-75 (1941). 
163. Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484,496 n.7 (1976)(Powell, J., concurring 
in the jUdgment). 
164. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 453 (Roberts, J., separate opinion). 
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istration of the criminal law as "that most awesome aspect of govern­
ment. ..."165 Consistent with Justice Frankfurter's assessment, a 
major theme166 of this article has been that the quality of a civilization 
may properly be judged by the methods employed in the enforcement 
of its criminal laws. 167 Thus, in our zeal to eradicate hoodlums and 
Mafia chief tans, we should take care not to forget our heritage and 
sense of fair play. Above all, we should not become criminals in our 
desire, however reasonable and praiseworthy, to fight crime. 168 This is 
a price that no enlightened society can afford to pay. It would be an 
awesome loss to gain security at the cost of offending our sense of 
justice and discrediting our commitment to the integrity of the rule of 
law. "Decency, security and liberty alike"169 dictate against such a 
tragic result. Ultimately, it would be liberty itself that would be lost in 
the excesses of unrestrained police practices that are repugnant to a 
criminal justice system that is constructed upon a moral foundation of 
fundamental fairness in the relations between government and its citi­
zens. Therefore, it is both the legal and the moral duty of government 
in a progressive society to enforce its criminal laws pursuant to a sense 
of justice and fairness, and within the limits of civilized standards of 
conduct. . 
It is true that crime has been a serious social problem in the urban 
centers of this nation. 170 In addition, criminal endeavors have become 
increasingly sophisticated and ingenious, as well as clandestine. This, 
in turn, has dramatically increased the burdens placed upon law en­
forcement authorities, especially in countering effectively the ex­
panding drug practices in our cities.l7l It is not suprising, therefore, 
that the police have turned with increasing frequency to the services of 
informants and undercover agents as useful tools in combatting crime 
165. Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 356 (1946)(Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
166. See supra text accompanying notes 2-5, 62-64. 
167. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 449 (1962); see Watts v. Indiana, 338 
U.S. 49, 54-55 (1949)(plurality opinion); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 343-47 
(1943); Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 HARv. L. REV. I, 25-26 
(1956). 
168. Cf Sherman, 356 U.S. at 372 (majority opinion) (although it is the function of 
law enforcement to prevent crime and apprehend criminals, "[m]anifestly, that function 
does not include the manufacturing of crime."); see id. at 384 (Frankfurter, J., concurring 
in the result)(it is not the function of government "to promote rather than detect crime and 
to bring about the downfall of those who, left to themselves, might well have obeyed the 
law"). 
169. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 485 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
170. See Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 496 n.7 (1976)(Powell, J., concur­
ring in the jUdgment). 
171. See id. at 495-96 n.7. 
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and penetrating criminal enterprises and conspiracies.172 
Justice Roberts has described the conflict and resultant tension 
between society and the criminal elements in colorful terms: 
Society is at war with the criminal classes, and courts have uni­
formly held that in waging this warfare the forces of prevention and 
detection may use traps, decoys, and deception to obtain evidence of 
the commission of crime. Resort to such means does not render an 
indictment thereafter found a nullity nor call for the exclusion of 
evidence so procured. 173 
Thus, a criminal prosecution will not be aborted simply because the 
government resorted to deceit l74 or obtained "evidence [of guilt] by 
artifice or deception."175 Neither may the doctrine of entrapment be 
invoked where government agents have only provided the opportu­
nity, or furnished the facilities, for the commission of crime. 176 Simi­
larly, mere evidence of solicitation is not sufficient to raise the issue of 
entrapment. 177 And a feigned friendship, or one offered under false 
pretenses, is not, as a matter of law, entrapment. 17S 
Nowhere is this need for "stealth and strategy"179 more pro­
nounced than in the efforts of government to stamp out the drug trade. 
Simply stated, informants and undercover agents are crucial to com­
batting drug-related and other contraband offenses. ISO In fact, they 
have even been permitted to supply drugs and other things of value to 
172. See Sherman, 356 U.S. at 372 (majority opinion), and id. at 381 (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring in the result); Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 453-54 (Roberts, J., separate opinion); 
United States v. Kaminski, 703 F.2d 1004, 1009-10 (7th Cir. 1983); United States v. Brown, 
635 F.2d 1207, 1213 (6th Cir. 1980); see also United States v. Lomas, 706 F.2d 886, 890 
(9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied sub nom. Margolis v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 720 (1984)(de­
fense conceded the propriety of such services); People v. Isaacson, 44 N.Y.2d 511, 524, 378 
N.E.2d 78, 85,406 N.Y.S.2d 714, 721 (1978). 
173. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 453-54 (Roberts, J., separate opinion)(footnote omitted); 
see United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 435-36 (1973). 
174. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 435-36 (1973). 
175. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 441 (majority opinion), and id. at 454 (Roberts, J., separate 
opinion); see Commonwealth v. Shuman, 391 Mass. 345, 351, 462 N.E.2d 80, 83 (1984); W. 
LAFAVE & A. SCOTI, supra note 21, § 48, at 369. 
176. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423,435 (1973); Sherman, 356 U.S. at 372 
(majority opinion), and id. at 382 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the result); Sorrells, 287 
U.S. at 441; see Casey v. United States, 276 U.S. 413, 424 (1928)(Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
177. See United States v. Luce, 726 F.2d 47, 49 (1st Cir. 1984); Kadis v. United 
States, 373 F.2d 370, 374 (1st Cir. 1967); Commonwealth v. Shuman, 391 Mass. 345, 351, 
462 N.E.2d 80, 83-84 (1984); Donnelly, supra note 24, at 1102. 
178. United States v. Jones, 487 F.2d 676, 678 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. 
Quevedo, 399 F.2d 307, 308 (9th Cir. 1968)(per curiam). Cj United States v. Ladley, 517 
F.2d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir. 1975)(discussing tactics found not to constitute entrapment). 
179. Sherman, 356 U.S. at 372. 
180. See Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 495 n.7 (1976)(Powell, J., concur­
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criminal enterprises in order to gain the confidence of those involved 
in illicit activities. 181 
But after conceding the practical everyday difficulties of combat­
ting modern criminal enterprises, and acknowledging the useful role of 
informers and undercover operations in exposing and solving crime, 182 
the fact remains that "there are limits to what either an informant or 
an undercover agent may dO."183 The courts may not "shirk the re­
sponsibility that is necessarily in [their] keeping ... to accomodate 
the dangers of overzealous law enforcement and civilized methods ad­
equate to counter the ingenuity of modern criminals."184 Therefore, 
the courts must be prepared to confront those situations involving law 
enforcement techniques employed against the criminal elements of so­
ciety where, as a result of government participation in, or creation of, 
crime, "there comes a time when enough is more than enough - iris 
just too much. When that occurs, the law must condemn it as offensive 
[to due process] whether the method used is refined or crude, subtle or 
spectacular."185 It may ultimately be only "a question of degree," 186 
but, by the exercise of sound judicial judgment, "[a] standard must be 
set somewhere and the line should be drawn"187 where government 
induces and effectively controls criminal activities in a manner that 
can only encourage lawlessness. 188 At that level of official misconduct, 
due process must step in and call a halt to any "prosecution conceived 
in or nurtured by such [outrageous] conduct ...."189 
Such conduct can be neither sanctioned nor tolerated, for it is 
ring in the jUdgment); United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 432 (1973); United States v. 
Twigg, 588 F.2d 373, 380 (3d Cir. 1978). 
181. See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 432 (1973); see also Hampton v. 
United States, 425 U.S. 484, 489-90 (1976)(plurality opinion)(practice implicitly endorsed), 
and id. at 491-92 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment); United States v. Lomas, 706 
F.2d 886, 890 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied sub nom. Margolis V. United States, 104 S. Ct. 
720 (1984) (defense acknowledged permissibility of such practices). 
182. See Williamson V. United States, 311 F.2d 441, 445 (5th Cir. 1962) (Brown, J., 
concurring specially). 
183. United States V. McQuin, 612 F.2d 1193, 1196 (9th Cir.)(per curiam)(emphasis 
added), cert. denied sub nom. Johnson v. United States, 445 U.S. 954 (1980). 
184. Sherman, 356 U.S. at 381 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the result). 
185. Williamson v. United States, 311 F.2d 441, 445 (5th Cir. 1962)(Brown, J., con­
curring specially)(emphasis added); accord, People V. Isaacson, 44 N.Y.2d 511, 523, 378 
N.E.2d 78, 84,406 N.Y.S.2d 714,721 (1978); see Note, supra note 22, at 1471-72. 
186. People v. Isaacson, 44 N.Y.2d 511, 523, 378 N.E.2d 78, 84, 406 N.Y.S.2d 714, 
721 (1978). 
187. Id. at 524, 378 N.E.2d at 85, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 721. 
188. See id. at 521-24, 378 N.E.2d at 83-85, 406 N.Y.S. at 719-21; see also United 
States v. Archer, 486 F.2d 670, 676-77 (2d Cir. I 973)(dictum). 
189. People V. Isaacson, 44 N.Y.2d 511, 522, 378 N.E.2d 78,83,406 N.Y.S.2d 714, 
719-20 (1978). 
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simply not a legitimate function of government to engage in crime. 190 
Justice Holmes, within the context of the illegal seizure of evidence, 
has admonished the courts, as a branch oj government, that if "the 
existing code [of decency and fundamental fairness)" does not permit 
the prosecution "to have a hand in such dirty business [of securing 
evidence of crime by illegal acts]," it will "not permit the judge to 
allow such iniquities to succeed."191 For Justice Holmes, there was 
"no distinction . . . between the government as prosecutor and the 
government as judge." 192 Further, it was but a deductive and logical 
conclusion that if evidence was inadmissible for having been obtained 
by unconstitutional means, it was also excludable for having been ob­
. tained by illegal acts of government agents.193 Therefore, while the 
detection of criminals was a "desirable" end of effective law enforce­
ment, for Justice Holmes it was more "desirable that the government 
should not itself Joster and pay for other crimes" in securing evidence 
of guilt. 194 Accordingly, Justice Holmes was prepared to choose, as "a 
less[er] evil[,] that some criminals should escape than that the govern­
ment should play an ignoble part."195 
An argument might be made that defining the limits of law en­
forcement involvement in crime without focusing on a defendant's 
predisposition will raise doctrinal and practical difficulties for the 
courtS. 196 Although such an argument raises legitimate issues, it 
should not be overlooked that the very essence of delineating these 
limits is to define fundamental fairness at particular times, in particu­
lar places, and within particular contexts. This is a task for which the 
courts are uniquely equipped to arrive at a just result by assessing and 
reasonably accommodating the competing interests at stake of the gov­
ernment, to detect and punish criminals, and of the individual, to be 
treated fairly within a framework of justice and decency. It is the 
purpose of constitutions "to preserve practical and substantial rights, 
not to maintain theories,"197 and it is the penultimate responsibility of 
the courts to implement this goal. No other institution of government 
is so well-qualified to discharge this awesome duty, even when "there 
190. See Sherman, 356 U.S. at 384 (Franfkfurter, J., concurring in the result); Olm­
stead, 277 U.S. at 485 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
191. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 470 (Holmes, J., dissenting)(emphasis added). 
192. Id. 
193. Id. at 471. 
194. Id. at 470 (emphasis added). 
195. Id. (emphasis added). 
196. See Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 494-95 & nn.5-6 (I 976)(Powell, J., 
concurring in the jUdgment). 
197. Davis v. Mills, 194 U.S. 451, 457 (1904). 
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is sometimes no sharply defined standard against which to make these 
judgments ...."198 
Finally, the most appealing aspects of the due process defense are 
its constitutional basis and the scope of its protection. These factors 
are interrelated and demonstrate the clear and present need for the 
defense. First, the defense will place both the federal and state law 
enforcement authorities of this nation under a charge that they will be 
required to satisfy, at a minimum, certain standards of decency and 
fair play in their investigation and apprehension of criminals. Second, 
by reason of its constitutional footing, the defense will apply to all 
alike, the innocent, the guilty, and the criminally predisposed. Thus, 
the defense is national in scope. It fills the protective gaps, both doc­
trinal and factual, created by the subjective test for entrapment with 
its parochial preoccupation with criminal propensity. 
D. Dynamics of the Defense 
1. Distinguished from Entrapment 
Although the due process defense is "a close relative of entrap­
ment,"199 it is independent.2°O It differs from entrapment in several 
important ways. In the first place, entrapment generally presents a 
question of fact, unless the defendant, as a matter of law, has estab­
lished it beyond a reasonable doubt. 201 Due process involves govern­
mental misconduct and, therefore, presents a question of law.202 
This result would appear, upon initial impression, to be somewhat 
at odds with the legal perception of due process as a flexible concept 
198. Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 495 n.6 (1976)(Powell, J., concurring 
in the judgment); see Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169-73 (1952). 
199. United States v. Ramirez, 710 F.2d 535, 539 (9th Cir. 1983). 
200. United States v. Lomas, 706 F.2d 886, 891 (9th Cir. 1983), eert. denied sub nom. 
Margolis v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 720 (1984); see United States v. Hunt, 36 CRIM. L. 
REP. (BNA) 2203, 2203 (4th Cir. Nov. 28, 1984) ("entrapment and due process claims ... 
are analytically distinct"); United States v. Lue, 498 F.2d 531, 534 (9th Cir.), eert. denied, 
419 U.S. 1031 (1974). 
201. United States v. Graves, 556 F.2d 1319, 1321 (5th Cir. 1977), eert. denied, 435 
U.S. 923 (1978); Goss v. United States, 376 F.2d 812,813 (5th Cir. 1967)(per curiam); see 
Sherman, 356 U.S. at 377; United States v. McQuin, 612 F.2d 1193, 1196 (9th Cir.)(per 
curiam), eert. denied sub nom. Johnson v. United States, 445 U.S. 954 (1980); United States 
v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373, 379 (3d Cir. 1978); People v. Peppars, 140 Cal. App. 3d 677, 685, 
189 Cal. Rptr. 879, 884 (1st Dist. 1983). 
202. United States v. Ramirez, 710 F.2d 535, 539 (9th Cir. 1983); see United States 
v. Nunez-Rios, 622 F.2d 1093, 1098 (2d Cir. 1980); United States v. Johnson, 565 F.2d 179, 
181-82 (1st Cir. 1977), eert. denied, 434 U.S. 1075 (1978); State v. Hohensee, 650 S.W.2d 
268, 272 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982). 
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which derives its meaning from "time, place and circumstances."203 
Closer examination, however, dispels the confusion. The essential 
meaning of due process is fundamental fairness. 204 If a determination 
of a denial of fundamental fairness were simply an issue of fact to be 
"left to a jury's unguided discretion, ... the [due process] defense as 
now understood would be transformed into an invitation to twelve ju­
rors to consider in virtually any case whether [a] defendant was 
treated 'fairly.' "205 This, a jury is not "equipped" to do. Therefore, it 
"should not be permitted to speculate on whether particular facts do 
or do not amount to fundamental fairness."206 Moreover, since the 
due process defense strikes at "the legality of law enforcement meth­
ods," the determination of the lawfulness of governmental conduct is a 
legal issue w~iCh. "must be made . . . by the trial judge, not the 
jury."207 
Ultimately, however, the very nature of due process as an evolv­
ing concept with "vague contours" and a "continuing process of appli­
cation" which defies meaning that is "final and fixed"208 precludes, as 
a practical necessity, as well as a constitutional precept, the participa­
tion of jurors in the task of determining when misconduct by govern­
ment has offended our sense of justice and shocked the conscience.209 
Therefore, if the issue of due process misconduct were a question of 
fact, a jury would be called upon to interpret a constitutional concept 
- a task that has been entrusted to the courts. As Justice Frankfurter 
has observed: 
Representing a profound attitude of fairness between man and man, 
and more particularly between the individual and government, "due 
process" is compounded of history, reason, the past course of Dudi­
cial] decisions, and stout confidence in the strength of the demo­
cratic faith which we profess. Due process is not a mechanical 
instrument. It is not a yardstick. It is a process. It is a delicate 
process of adjustment inescapably involving the exercise of judg­
ment by those Dudicial officers] whom the Constitution entrusted 
203. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162 (1951) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
204. See supra text accompanying notes 69-70. 
205. United States v. Johnson, 565 F.2d 179, 182 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 
U.S. 1075 (1978). 
206. Id.; see United States v. Nunez-Rios, 622 F.2d 1093, 1098 (2d Cir. 1980)(since 
the due process defense is based upon defects in the institution of a prosecution, "this 
defense is properly decided by the court and not the jury."). 
207. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 441 (1973)(Stewart, J., dissenting). 
208. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 170 (1952). 
209. Cj id. at 169-73 (implicitly endorsing the constitutional duty of the judiciary to 
interpret and apply due process as an evolutionary concept). 
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with the unfolding of the process.210 
The second major distinction between due process and entrap­
ment lies in the availability of the due process defense to a predisposed 
defendant,211 while proof of predisposition is fatal to a claim of entrap­
ment,212 even though the accused may not have given the police rea­
sonable cause to suspect, prior to their investigation, that he was 
engaged in criminal activity.213 In addition, the due process defense is 
one of constitutional dimension,214 while the defense of entrapment is 
not. 215 
The respective scopes of the two defenses highlight the fourth and 
final major distinction between due process and entrapment. 
Although both doctrines provide relief from government misconduct 
in the enforcement of the criminal law, the scope of the' due process 
protection extends beyond that of entrapment216 and reaches "[p]olice 
overinvolvement in crime [which attains] a demonstrable level of out­
rageousness"217 that is sufficient to shock the conscience and a sense of 
justice. 
In spite of these differences, however, the due process defense 
does tend "to overlap with the entrapment defense."218 This has con­
tributed to a difficulty in delineating "the conduct circumscribed by 
the due process defense ...."219 Moreover, as the Third Circuit has 
observed, "the lines between the objective test of entrapment favored 
by a minority of the [Supreme Court] [j]ustices and the due process 
defense accepted by a majority of the [j]ustices are indeed 
hazy...."220 This, in turn, has prompted some federal circuits to 
210. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162-63 (1951) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (emphasis added); see Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 
137, 177-80 (1803)(it is the duty of the judiciary to say what the law is and to interpret 
constitutions). 
211. See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
212. See supra text accompanying note 60. 
213. See United States v. Swets, 563 F.2d 989, 991 (10th Cir. 1977), cerro denied, 434 
U.S. 1022 (1978); United States v. Ordner, 554 F.2d 24, 27-28 (2d Cir.), cerro denied, 434 
U.S. 824 (1977); Note, supra note 22, at 1467-68. 
214. See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
215. See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 432-33 (1973). 
216. Cf United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578, 607 (3d Cir.)(en bane), cert. denied, 
457 U.S. 1106 (1982)("a successful due process defense must be predicated on intolerable 
government conduct which goes beyond that necessary to sustain an entrapment defense"). 
217. Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484,495 n.7 (1976)(Powell, J., concurring 
in the jUdgment). 
218. United States V. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578, 606 (3d Cir.)(en bane), cerr. denied, 457 
U.S. 1106 (1982). 
219. [d. 
220. [d. at 608. 
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adopt the postion that courts should be careful "not to undermine the 
[Supreme] Court's consistent rejection of the objective test of entrap­
ment by permitting it to reemerge cloaked as a due process 
defense."221 
2. Scope of the Defense 
a. Governing Principles 
Once a court is prepared to recognize the existence of a due pro­
cess defense, it must then determine the limits of such a defense. It 
has been observed, concerning this issue, that while the scope of the 
due process defense is "potentially broad, [it] has in fact been severely 
restricted"222 to a level of misconduct that shocks the conscience and a 
sense of justice.223 - This degree of outrageousness has been character­
ized as "go[ing] beyond that necessary to sustain an entrapment de­
fense."224 Moreover, the Supreme Court has yet to reverse a 
conviction because of pervasive involvment of government in crime;225 
and the federal circuits, to date, have done so in only two cases,226 
which involved the generation or manufacture of crimes solely for pur­
poses of prosecution.227 Still, as these examples imply, the perception 
of offensive behavior must be sufficiently broad to permit that degree 
of flexibility required for the "delicate [and ongoing] process of adjust­
ment"228 that permits due process to grow through experience and 
adapt to changing circumstances. 229 Closely related to this inquiry are 
the standards of fairness against which a court will objectively mea­
221. Id.; accord, United States v. Kelly, 707 F.2d 1460, 1475-76 (D.C. Cir.) (Gins­
burg, J.,separate opinion)(lower federal courts "may not alter the contours of the entrap­
ment defense under a due process cloak")(footriote omitted), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 264 
(1983); United States v. Williams, 705 F.2d 603, 619 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 524 
(1983). 
222. United States v. Ramirez, 7 \0 F.2d 535, 539 (9th Cir. 1983). 
223. See id.; United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578, 608 (3d Cir.)(en bane), cen. 
denied, 457 U.S. 1 \06 (1982)("the majority of the [Supreme] Court has manifestly reserved 
for the constitutional defense [of due process] only the most intolerable government con­
duct"); cf Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172-74 (1952)(conduct that shocks the con­
science and offends a sense of justice is conduct that violates the principles of due process). 
224. United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578, 607 (3d Cir.)(en bane), cen. denied, 457 
U.S. 1 \06 (1982). 
225. United States v. Ramirez, 7 \0 F.2d 535, 539 (9th Cir. 1983). 
226. United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1978); Greene v. United States, 
454 F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1971). 
227. United States v. Ramirez, 7\0 F.2d 535, 539-40 (9th Cir. 1983). 
228. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 163 (1951) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
229. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169-72 (1952); Joint Anti-Fascist Refu­
gee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162-63, 174 (1951)(Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
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sure police conduct. Here, the states are not limited to the minimum 
standards mandated by the United States Constitution as interpreted 
by the Supreme Court, and may "impose higher standards on law en­
forcement practices pursuant to their own constitutions."23o 
Invoking the principles of due process as a restraint upon the 
power of government to seek judicial procedures in obtaining criminal 
convictions is a doctrine of ancient origin, and is traceable to the 
Magna Charta.231 A classic example of the doctrine is when govern­
ment agents obtain evidence of crime by brutalizing a defendant. Such 
conduct goes beyond merely offending "some fastidious squeamishness 
or private sentimentalism about combatting crime too energeti­
cally."232 Rather, "[t]his is conduct that shocks the conscience,"233 
and a conviction resulting from such methods offends; our sense of jus­
tice and fair play and the standards of civilized conduct.234 
The degree of misconduct, however, which will warrant the bar­
ring of prosecution, should not be restricted to situations involving 
police brutality that rivals "the rack and the screw"235 in its assault 
upon human dignity.236 To do so would drastically reduce the scope 
of protection provided by the due process defense.237 Furthermore, it 
would unduly hamper the duty of courts "[t]o prevent improper and 
unwarranted police solicitation of crime. . . . "238 It would simply be 
stretching credulity to equate brutality with "solicitation." Neither 
would "[p]olice overinvolvement in crime [that] ... reach[ed] a de­
230. Mascolo, Probable Cause Revisited: Some Disturbing Implications Emanating 
from Illinois v. Gates, 6 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 331,402 (1983); accord. People v. Isaacson, 
44 N.Y.2d 511, 519, 378 N.E.2d 78,82,406 N.Y.S.2d 714, 718 (1978)(applying higher 
standards to due process defense); see Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of 
Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 498-504 (1977); cf Cooper v. California, 386 
U.S. 58, 62 (1967)(dictum)(acknowledging the right of the states to impose, as a matter of 
state law, higher standards on searches and seizures than are required by the federal 
Constitution). 
231. People v. Isaacson, 44 N.Y.2d 511, 520, 378 N.E.2d 78,82,406 N.Y.S.2d 714, 
719 (1978). 
232. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952). 
233. Id. 
234. Id. at 172-74; see Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 285-86 (1936); Lomas, 
706 F.2d at 891; United States v. Lue, 498 F.2d 531, 534 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 
1031 (1974). 
235. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952). 
236. See People v. Isaacson, 44 N.Y.2d 511, 520, 378 N.E.2d 78, 83, 406 N.Y.S.2d 
714,719 (1978); The Supreme Court. 1972 Term, 87 HARV. L. REV. 57,252 (l973)(herein­
after cited as Supreme Court Term); Comment, supra note 31, at 666-67, 669. 
237. See Supreme Court Term, supra note 236, at 252. 
238. People v. Isaacson, 44 N.Y.2d 511, 520-21, 378 N.E.2d 78, 83,406 N.Y.S.2d 
714, 719 (1978)(emphasis added). 
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monstrable level of outrageousness"239 - the level of misconduct in­
sisted upon by Justice Powell to trigger the due process defense - be 
confined to acts of brutality. Partners in crime, the situation envi­
sioned by the due process defense, are not in the business of brutaliz­
ing, or physically coercing, one another into criminal activity. 
Moreover, government induces one to crime not merely by acts of in­
timidation but also by promises of profit or advantage. Similarly, gov­
ernment involvement in the planning, execution, and control of crime 
can become unconstitutionally pervasive without also attaining the 
level of brutality involving "physical or psychological coercion that 
'shocks the conscience.' "240 
239. Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484,495 n.7 (1976)(Powell, J., concurring 
in the judgment). 
240. United States v. Kelly, 707 F.2d 1460, 1476 n.l3 (D.C. Cir.) (Ginsburg, J., 
separate opinion), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 264 (1983). Judge Ginsburg, in her separate 
opinion in Kelly, interpreted Supreme Court precedent as limiting the due process defense 
to acts of" 'coercion, violence[,] or brutality to the person.' " Id. (quoting Irvine v. Califor­
nia, 347 U.S. 128, 133 (1954)(p1ura1ity opinion». In reaching this conclusion, Judge Gins­
burg appears to have relied upon Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (l954)(plurality 
opinion), and Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952). However, the plurality in Irvine 
was quick to distinguish that case, as Judge Ginsburg herself acknowledged, from Rochin, 
relied upon by the defendant, which involved the forcible extraction of evidence from 
Rochin's body by means of a stomach pump. It was within this framework that Justice 
Jackson, writing for the Irvine plurality, observed that "[h]owever obnoxious are the facts 
in the case before us, they do not involve coercion, violence[,] or brutality to the person [as 
did Rochin]." Irvine, 347 U.S. at 133. Similarly, Justice Frankfurter's trenchant condem­
nation of the forcible extraction of the contents of the Rochin defendant's stomach as "con­
duct that shocks the conscience," Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172, did not imply a due process 
restriction to such offensive methods. To the contrary, his exhaustive analytical treatment 
of due process in Rochin. id. at 169-73, as a product of history and a flexible concept that 
provided the "most comprehensive protection of liberties," id. at 170, speaks to an opposite 
result. Thus, any reliance upon either Irvine or Rochin in support of restrictions upon the 
scope of the due process defense is simply misplaced. Even Judge Ginsburg conceded that 
such a limitation upon the reach of the defense would exclude from due process protection 
"flagrant misconduct on the part of the police ... ." Kelly, 707 F.2d at 1476 (emphasis 
added). The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, however, appears to have accepted 
Judge Ginsburg's assessment of the Supreme Court precedents. See Commonwealth v. 
Shuman, 391 Mass. 345, 354-55,462 N.E.2d 80, 85 (1984). 
Judge Ginsburg's restrictive concept of the due process defense is particularly perplex­
ing. in view of her reliance upon Justice Powell's standard of "[p]olice overinvolvement in 
crime [that] ... reach[ed] a demonstrable level of outrageousness," Hampton v. United 
States, 425 U.S. 484, 495 n.7 (l976)(Powell, J .• concurring in the judgment), as the "requi­
site level of outrageousness" to offend due process. Kelly, 707 F.2d at 1476 (Ginsburg, J., 
separate opinion). Clearly, however. Justice Powell's standard encompasses more than 
" 'coercion. violence[,] or brutality to the person,' " id., or police brutality involving "physi­
calor psychological coercion that 'shocks the conscience,''' id. at 1476 n.l3 (interpreting 
lower federal precedents). See United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373, 376-81 (3d Cir. 1978); 
Greene v. United States, 454 F.2d 783, 785-87 (9th Cir. 1971); State v. Glasson, 36 CRIM. 
L. REP. 2380, 2380-81, (Fla. Jan. 17, 1985) (applying defense to prosecutions based upon 
the testimony of vital state informants who stand to gain a fee conditioned upon their 
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Conduct that is repugnant to fundamental fairness and standards 
of civilized decency - conduct that shocks the conscience and offends 
a sense of justice - does not lend itself to rigid analysis or formal 
exactitude.241 It can arise in a variety of situations depending upon 
time, place, and surrounding circumstances, as well as the nature of 
the crime in question and the manner in which the particular criminal 
activity is usually engaged in or carried on.242 Moreover, encounters 
between government and citizen are too multifaceted and diverse to fit 
into a neat equation of what is acceptable and what is unacceptable 
conduct that will govern all situations, irrespective of time, place, and 
circumstance. Thus, the limits of conduct repugnant to a sense of jus­
tice, and, therefore, offensive to due process, defy the constrictions of 
precise formulation and rigid conceptualization. 
The scope of the defense must extend as far as the remedy de­
manded by the peculiar government conduct in question. Regardless 
of the means employed, the ends remain the same: On one hand, the 
government's objective is the inducement of the citizen to crime, by 
whatever methods are effective, to secure a conviction. The court's 
remedy, on the other hand, is to protect the citizen from such conduct 
by denying to the government the aid of the judicial processes. Hence, 
the scope of the due process defense will be defined by the means em­
ployed by government to obtain impermissible ends: the apprehension 
and conviction of citizens for "government-induced criminality."243 
The key element in this mix of factors will be the degree of govern­
ment involvement in the criminal enterprise. If the government has 
manufactured a crime to secure a conviction, then the defense will 
intercede to prevent a conviction, not for the benefit of the defendant, 
but "to protect the Constitution. "244 This test, which is rooted in no­
tions of decency and fair play, applies an objective analysis to law en­
forcement conduct, and measures that conduct against due process 
standards of fundamental fairness, irrespective of the criminal predis­
position of the defendant.245 
cooperation and testimony); State v. Hohensee, 650 S.W.2d 268, 268-70, 274 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1982). 
241. People v. Isaacson, 44 N.Y.2d 511, 521, 378 N.E.2d 78, 83, 406 N.Y.S.2d 714, 
719 (1978). See infra text accompanying notes 421-24. 
242. Cf Sherman, 356 U.S. at 384-85 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the re­
sult)(applying criteria to conduct condemned under the objective analysis of entrapment). 
243. United States v. Archer, 486 F.2d 670, 677 (2d Cir. I 973)(dictum). 
244. United States v. Beverly, 723 F.2d II, 13 (3d Cir. 1983)(per curiam); see United 
States v. Archer, 486 F.2d 670, 676-77 (2d Cir. I 973)(dictum). 
245. See Comment, supra note 31, at 669. 
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b. The Direct Violation of a Protected Right of the Defendant 
A fundamental aspect of the scope of the due process defense ad­
dresses the issue of limiting its application to instances of police mis­
conduct that directly infringes upon or violates some protected right 
of a defendant. This issue not only implicates the scope of the defense 
but also calls into question the very quality of the defense. To be more 
specific, does the due process defense against outrageous government 
conduct in the enforcement of the criminal law create a right on behalf 
of each individual to be protected from government-induced criminal­
ity, or does the defense apply only when the misconduct directly vio­
lates some protected right of the defendant that exists independently of 
the government's activity or behavior? 
By way of dictum in United States v. Russell,246 the Supreme 
Court suggested the existence of the due process defense: "[W]e may 
some day be presented with a situation in which the conduct of law 
enforcement agents is so outrageous that due process principles would 
absolutely bar the government from invoking judicial processes to ob­
tain a conviction ...."247 As support for this proposition, the Court 
cited248 Rochin v. California. 249 Rochin involved the forcible extrac­
tion of evidence from the defendant's body by methods that 
"shock[ed] the conscience"250 of the Court - a stomach pump. The 
Supreme Court condemned these procedures as going beyond merely 
offending "some fastidious squeamishness or private sentimentalism 
about combatting crime too energetically."25 1 These were, in the 
Court's perception, "methods too close to the rack and the screw"252 
to pass constitutional muster, and clearly offended due process253 by 
their brutal disregard of the "decencies of civilized conduct."254 Thus, 
the Court, in Rochin, would not tolerate convitions secured "by meth­
ods that offend 'a sense of justice.' "255 
In United States v. Archer,256 the government argued that the 
Supreme Court's reference to Rochin in the Russell dictum confirmed 
that it perceived the due process defense as one limited to conduct 
246. 411 U.S. 423 (1973). 
247. Id. at 431-32 (dictum). 
248. Id. at 432. 
249. 342 U.S. 165 (1952). 
250. Id. at 172. 
251. Id. 
252. Id. 
253. Id. at 174. 
254. Id. at 173. 
255. Id.; see Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 285-86 (1936). 
256. 486 F.2d 670 (2d Cir. 1973). 
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which shocked the judicial conscience and directly infringed upon the 
rights of a defendant. 257 The Second Circuit, while finding it unneces­
sary to decide this issue because reversal was warranted on another 
ground,258 appeared to endorse a broader application of the defense 
than that advocated by the government,259 It incorporated the princi­
ples articulated by Justice Brandeis in his Olmstead dissent260 and sug­
gested the existence of a general due process right "of citizens to be 
free from government-induced criminality."261 Judge Friendly states: 
[T]here is certainly a limit to allowing governmental involvement in 
crime. It would be unthinkable, for example, to permit government 
agents to instigate robberies and beatings merely to gather evidence 
to convict other members of a gang of hoodlums. Governmental "in­
vestigation" involving participation in activities that result in injury 
to the rights of its citizens is a course that courts should be ex­
tremely reluctant to sanction. Prosecutors and their agents natu­
rally tend to assign great weight to the societal interest in 
apprehending and convicting criminals; the danger is that they will 
assign too little to the rights of citizens to be free from government­
induced criminality.262 
As this passage clearly suggests, the Archer court was prepared, if the 
situation had arisen, to withhold the judicial processes from the prose­
cution of even "a gang of hoodlums" for government-instigated crime. 
The only opportunity that the Supreme Court has had to indi­
rectly address the limits of the due process defense was presented in 
Hampton v. United States. 263 In Hampton, a plurality264 of the Court, 
speaking through Justice Rehnquist, appeared to have implicitly re­
jected the defense in the case of a predisposed defendant, and to have 
limited its scope to direct infringement of the rights of a defendant.265 
In the words of the plurality: "The limitations of . . . [d]ue 
[p]rocess... come into play only when the [g]overnment activity in 
question violates some protected right of the defendant."266 But, for 
257. [d. at 676. 
258. [d. at 677. 
259. [d. at 676-77 & n.6 (dictum). 
260. See supra text accompanying notes 89-104. 
261. 486 F.2d at 677 (dictum). 
262. [d. at 676-77 (dictum)(emphasis added). 
263. 425 U.S. 484 (1976). 
264. Consisting of Chief Justice Burger, Justice White, and Justice Rehnquist. 
265. See id. at 490. 
266. [d. (emphasis in the original); accord, United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 
737 n.9 (1980)(quoting Hampton with approval). Cf United States v. Kelly, 707 F.2d 1460, 
1476 (D.C. Cir.)(Ginsburg, J., separate opinion)(1ower federal courts "lack authority, 
where no specific constitutional right of the defendant has been violated, to dismiss indict­
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the Hampton plurality, this could not be, for the defendant, the gov­
ernment agents, and their informant had all "acted in concert with one 
another."267 Thus, an accused would not be able to invoke the protec­
tion of due process from police conduct clearly offensive to notions of 
fair play and decency and standards of fundamental fairness, if that 
conduct did not also directly infringe upon a protected right of the 
defendant. 268 
It is submitted that such a restrictive concept of the due process 
defense would deprive it of much of its vitality, and would result in the 
unseemly spectacle of government enforcing its criminal laws by meth­
ods that are offensive to "the charter of its own existence."269 Fur­
thermore, it would effectively deny protection to the predisposed 
defendant, a result clearly intended by the Hampton plurality, for it is 
difficult to conceive of police conduct that would directly infringe 
upon a separate protected right of one predisposed to the commission 
of the very offense of which he is charged. Since predisposition would 
also strip him of the entrapment defense,27o the predisposed defendant 
would be without a remedy for unconstitutional practices employed 
against him in the enforcement of the criminal law. 
More fundamentally, however, to perceive the concept of due 
process as a protection that is triggered only by government activity 
that violates some separate right of the defendant is to ignore reality. 
In Rochin v. Caiijornia,271 the leading federal case on the issue of gov­
ernmental misconduct in the enforcement of the criminal law, Justice 
Frankfurter did not rest his decision reversing the defendant's convic­
tion simply on any violation of a separate protected right to privacy or 
the right to be free from bodily assaults and batteries. To the con­
trary, he cried out against the very methods employed by the police to 
obtain evidence of the defendant's guilt - forcibly extracting, first 
manually and then by means of a stomach pump, two capsules of mor­
phine from his body.272 The rationale of the Court's decision was 
forcefully articulated by Justice Frankfurter: 
ments as an exercise of supervisory power over the conduct of federal law enforcement 
agents" (emphasis in the original», cert. denied 104 S. Ct. 264 (1983). 
267. 425 U.S. at 490. 
268. See Comment, supra note 31, at 666. The majority of the Hampton Court did 
not comment on the scope of the due process defense, and, therefore, did not intimate a 
position on this issue. 
269. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961). 
270. See supra text accompanying notes 22-25. 
271. 342 U.S. 165 (1952). 
272. Id. at 166. 
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Applying these general considerations [of the governing principles 
of due process] to the circumstances of the present case, we are 
compelled to conclude that the proceedings by which this convic­
tion was obtained do more than offend some fastidious squeamish­
ness or private sentimentalism about combatting crime too 
energetically. This is conduct that shocks the conscience. Illegally 
breaking into the privacy of the petitioner, the struggle to open his 
mouth and remove what was there, the forcible extraction of his 
stomach's contents - this course of proceeding by agents of gov­
ernment to obtain evidence is bound to offend even hardened sensi­
bility. They are methods too close to the rack and the screw to permit 
of constitutional differentiation. 273 
Although the methods employed in Rochin did violate the pri­
vacy of the defendant's person, it is clear that Justice Frankfurter 
rested the Court's decision primarily on the means used and not sim­
ply on the issue of privacy. Thus, while the defendant's privacy con­
cerns were implicated by the practices to which the government 
resorted, it was the conduct itself that "shock[ed] the conscience" of . 
the Court and smacked of "methods too close to the rack and the 
screw to permit of constitutional differentiation."274 The violation of 
privacy may have been effected, but it was the "brutal conduct" em­
ployed which offended notions offair play and decency.275 For Justice 
Frankfurter, to sanction such methods "would be to afford brutality 
the cloak of the law."276 He concluded, therefore, that ''force so brutal 
and so offensive to human dignity in securing evidence from a suspect" 
offended due process.277 
It is clear that Justice Frankfurter measured the police conduct in 
Rochin against due process standards of fundamental fairness. He did 
not base the Court's decision exclusively on principles of privacy. 
Moreover, if it had been the intent of the Rochin Court to have pro­
tected only privacy interests, it could easily have done so. The opinion 
of the Court, however, is primarily devoid of such concerns. 
Although the protection afforded would secure privacy interests, 
Rochin sought also to place a constitutional limitation upon law en­
forcement conduct by measuring police practices against due process 
standards of fundamental fairness. Thus, the individual's privacy con­
cerns would be addressed through the implementing restrictions im­
273. [d. at 172 (emphasis added). 
274. [d. 
275. [d. at 173. 
276. [d. 
277. [d. at 174 (emphasis added). 
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posed by due process on governmental activities, while, 
simultaneously, the police would be held accountable for their behav­
ior. The conclusion is inescapable, therefore, that Rochin endorsed a 
due process right of the individual to be free from outrageous govern­
mental conduct in the enforcement of the criminal law. 
This result makes good sense. To equate the due process defense 
with law enforcement conduct that directly infringes upon or violates 
some separate right of a defendant, as the Hampton plurality sug­
gested and as the government urged in Archer, would effectively sepa­
rate the defendant, for all practical purposes, from the protection of 
the defense except in Rochin-type situations. Further, it would de­
grade, by its limiting rationale, the very concept of due process as "a 
profound attitude of fairness. . . between the individual and govern­
ment. ..."278 Ultimately, however, the most glaring flaw in the 
Hampton plurality's suggestion stems from its fundamental miscon­
ception of due process. Due process does not exist simply to vindicate 
other rights. It is a right intrinsic to itself. It secures for all persons 
the "most comprehensive protection of liberties...."279 For exam­
ple, the more limiting rights to counsel and against compulsory self­
incrimination, secured respectively by the sixth280 and fifth281 amend­
ments to the United States Constitution, are but specific guarantees of 
this broad protection.282 Therefore, it is submitted that the protection 
of due process, with its comprehensive guarantee of fairness in the re­
lations between government and citizen, is not dependent upon any 
violation, by police misconduct, of a separate right of the defendant. 
It is further submitted that there exists for each individual a specific 
due process guarantee to be free from government-induced criminal­
ity, and that it is beyond the pale oflegitimate conduct for government 
to prey upon its citizens in the hope of inducing them to crime.283 
This guarantee, while securing and implementing for the individual 
the more general right of privacy "to be let alone [by government],"284 
278. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162 (1951) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring)(emphasis added). 
279. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 170. 
280. U.S. CONST. amend. VI: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy 
the right. . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." 
281. U.S. CONST. amend. V: "No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal 
case to be a witness against himself. . . ." 
282. See. e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342-45 (1963)(right to counsel in 
state prosecutions is fundamental and essential to a fair trial under fourteenth amendment 
principles of due process); Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172-73 (dictum)(coerced confessions in state 
criminal proceedings offend principles of fairness under due process). 
283. See Archer, 486 F.2d at 676-77 (dictum). 
284. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478 (Brandeis. J., dissenting). 
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will act independently to place law enforcement officials under consti­
tutionally prescribed standards of decency and moral behavior. Simi­
larly, the courts of this nation possess the inherent power, as a matter 
of public policy and in furtherance ofjudicial integrity and their super­
visory powers,285 to close their doors to such foul and dirty 
business.286 
285. Courts possess inherent supervisory powers over their proceedings "to preserve 
the integrity of the judicial process," United States v. Ramirez, 710 F.2d 535, 541 (9th Cir. 
1983), and to ensure that neither justice is denied nor injustice is rewarded. In the federal 
system, the powers "first appeared as an independent basis of decision in McNabb v. United 
States, 318 U.S. 332 [1943] ...." Ramirez, 710 F.2d at 541. These powers are invoked to 
formulate and apply proper and civilized standards for the enforcement of the criminal law 
in judicial proceedings. See Sherman, 356 U.S. at 380 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the 
result); McNabb, 318 U.S. at 340-41. Thus, the courts, in crafting remedies pursuant to 
their supervisory powers, will be "guided by considerations ofjustice ...." McNabb,318 
U.S. at 341; accord, United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 505 (1983). 
The powers may be employed to implement remedies, not specficially required by 
either constitutional mandate or legislative command, for violations or denials of recog­
nized rights, to preserve judicial integrity, and to deter illegal conduct or improper prac­
tices. See Hasting, 461 U.S. at 505; Ramirez, 710 F.2d at 541; see also United States v. 
Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 736 n.8 (1980) ("we agree that the supervisory power serves the 
'twofold' purpose of deterring illegality and protecting judicial integrity"), and id. at 734-37 
& nn. 7-9. Cf United States v. Kelly, 707 F.2d 1460, 1476 (D.C. Cir.)(Ginsburg, J., sepa­
rate opinion)(1ower federal courts "lack authority, where no specific constitutional right of 
the defendant has been violated, to dismiss indictments as an exercise of supervisory power 
oVer the conduct of federal law enforcement agents" (emphasis in the original», cert. de­
nied, 104 S. Ct. 264 (1983). 
Not surprisingly, therefore, the aid of a court's supervisory powers has been endorsed, 
explicitly or implicitly, as a remedy for barring convictions, even of predisposed defendants, 
because of outrageous law enforcement practices. In fact, a majority of the Supreme Court 
justices in Hampton suggested their willingness to invoke the supervisory powers in cases of 
police misconduct in the enforcement ot the criminal law that is sufficiently offensive to 
violate principles of due process, irrespective of the predisposition of the defendants. 
Hampton, 425 U.S. at 493-97 (Powell & Blackmun, JJ., concurring in the judgment) (inter­
preting United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973), as not foreclosing such aid) (explicit); 
id. at 497 (Brennan, Stewart, & Marshall, JJ., dissenting)(explicit); Sherman, 356 U.S. at 
380 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the result) (entrapment cases) (explicit); see Sorrells, 287 
U.S. at 455, 457, 459 (Roberts, J., separate opinion)(entrapment cases) (implicit); Casey, 
276 U.S. at 423-24, 425 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (entrapment cases) (implicit); see also 
Sherman, 356 U.S. at 385 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the result). However, supervisory 
relief will not be forthcoming because of governmental misconduct, unless there exists "a 
clear basis in fact and law for doing so ...." Ramirez, 710 F.2d at 541 (where actions of 
law enforcement officers do not exceed "the bounds of permissible investigatory conduct," 
aid will be denied, and a court "need inquire no further"). 
286. Cf Sherman, 356 U.S. at 380, 385 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the result) 
(endorsing concept in entrapment cases); Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 455, 457, 459 (Roberts, J., 
separate opinion); Casey, 276 U.S. at 423-24, 425 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see Donnelly, 
supra note 24, at 1112. 
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3. The Supreme Court and the Predisposed Defendant 
In Hampton v. United States,287 a prosecution for the sale of her­
oin to government undercover agents, the Supreme Court was afforded 
an opportunity to address the issue of the applicability of the due pro­
cess defense to a criminally predisposed defendant. Although the 
court in United States v. Rusself288 had suggested, in dictum, the exist­
ence of such a defense,289 and the necessary corollary that predispos­
tion would not exclude a defendant from due process relief, a plurality 
of justices in Hampton backed off from this position. 
Writing for the plurality, Justice Rehnquist argued that the only 
remedy available to a defendant who has encouraged the acts of gov­
ernment agents "lies solely in the defense of entrapment."290 How­
ever, as Justice Rehnquist observed, predisposition is fatal to this 
defense. 291 
Justice Rehnquist then proceeded to reaffirm292 the comment 
made by the court in Russell that the defense of entrapment "was not 
intended to give the federal judiciary a 'chancellor's foot' veto over law 
enforcement practices of which it did not approve. "293 In addition, he 
quoted, with approval,294 the further observation made in Russell that 
"[t]he execution of the federal laws under our Constitution is confided 
primarily to the [e]xecutive [b]ranch of the [g]overnment, subject to 
applicable constitutional and statutory limitations and to judicially 
fashioned rules to enforce those limitations."295 But, to the Hampton 
plurality, as Justice Rehnquist explained, the "limitations" of due pro­
cess are triggered only by governmental misconduct which "violates 
some protected right of the defendant."296 In Hampton, however, the 
defendant, the government agents, and their informant had all acted in 
concert with one another.297 Moreover, the defense of entrapment was 
available to the defendant only if he could establish that he had been 
287. 425 U.S. 484 (1976). 
288. 411 U.S. 423 (1973). 
289. Id. at 431-32 (dictum). 
290. 425 U.S. at 490 (emphasis added). 
291. Id. 
292. Id. 
293. 411 U.S. at 435. 
294. 425 U.S. at 490 (plurality opinion). 
295. 411 U.S. at 435. 
296. 425 U.S. at 490 (plurality opinion) (emphasis in the original); accord, United 
States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 737 n.9 (l980)(quoting Hampton with approval). 
297. 425 U.S. at 490 (plurality opinion). In both Hampton, id. at 485-87 & n.3, 489­
90, and Russell, 411 U.S. at 425-27, 433, 436, the facts revealed, and the defendants con­
ceded, predisposition. 
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induced by government agents to engage in criminal activity.298 
Finally, Justice Rehnquist touched upon illegal activity of police 
officers that exceeded "the scope of their duties" and was performed 
"in concert with a defendant. ..."299 Here, according to the plural­
ity, the appropriate remedy lay, not in granting freedom to the equally 
culpable defendant, but in prosecuting the offending officers.300 There­
fore, it would seem that the Hampton plurality implicitly rejected the 
due process defense in the case of a predisposed defendant, no matter 
how outrageous the governmental misconduct. 301 In sum, it would 
appear that the Hampton plurality viewed predispostion as being as 
fatal to the due process defense as it is to the entrapment defense. 302 
This rigid position was too much for Justice Powell, who, joined 
by Justice Blackmun in an opinion concurring in the judgement, took 
exception to the plurality's attempt to deny due process relief to a 
predisposed defendant, "regardless of the outrageousness of police be­
havior in light of the surrounding circumstances. "303 He could find no 
support for such a result either in Russell or in the earlier cases which 
had delineated the defense of entrapment and its primary focus upon 
the defendant's predisposition.304 Further, Justice Powell noted that 
the Supreme Court had "yet to confront [g]overnment overinvolve­
ment in areas outside the realm of contraband offenses."305 "In these 
circumstances," therefore, he was not prepared to conclude "that an 
analysis other than one limited to predisposition would never be ap­
propriate under due process principles."306 
Justice Powell took further exception to the plurality's "use of the 
'chancellor's foot' passage from Russell" as a potential means of fore­
closing reliance on the Court's supervisory power "to bar conviction of 
a predisposed defendant because of outrageous police conduct."307 
Again, he did not understand Russell "to have gone so far," for that 
case had indicated only that the Court "should be extremely reluctant 
to invoke the supervisory power in cases of this kind because that 
298. 425 U.S. at 490 (plurality opinion); Russell, 411 U.S. at 435; Sorrells, 287 U.S. 
at 442, 452. 
299. 425 U.S. at 490 (plurality opinion). 
300. Id. 
301. See id. at 492 (Powell, J., concurring in the jUdgment). 
302. See United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578, 606-07 (3d Cir.)(en banc), cert. 
denied, 457 U.S. 1106 (1982); United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373, 377-79 (3d Cir. 1978). 
303. 425 U.S. at 492 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment). 
304. Id. at 492-93 & n.2. 
305. Id. at 493. 
306. Id. (footnote omitted). 
307. Id. 
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power does not give the 'federal judiciary a "chancellor's foot" veto 
over law enforcement practices of which it [does] not approve.' "308 
Justice Powell was "not unmindful of the doctrinal and practical 
difficulties of delineating limits to police involvement in crime that do 
not focus on predisposition, as [g]overnment participation ordinarily 
will be fully justified in society's 'war with the criminal classes.' "309 
He recognized that this "undoubtedly" was the concern that 
prompted the plurality in Hampton "to embrace an absolute rule."310 
Justice Powell believed, however, that Russell had "left these questions 
open,"3!! and since this case was "controlled completely by Rus­
sell,"3!2 he was unwilling to conclude that, "no matter what the cir­
cumstances," neither due process nor the Court's supervisory powers 
"could support a bar to conviction in any case where the [g]overnment 
is able to prove predisposition."3!3 
Justice Powell was concerned that the "discussion of predisposi­
tion" might "overlook the fact that there may be widely varying de­
grees of criminal involvement."3!4 More fundamentally, howerer, he 
believed that "[a] fair system of justice normally should eschew un­
bending rules that foreclose, in their application, all judicial 
discretion."3!5 
Although Justice Powell recognized that it would be difficult to 
define proper limitations upon police involvement in criminal activi­
ties, he did not believe that "these difficulties. . . justify the plurality'S 
absolute rule."3!6 The essence of due process is "fundamental fair­
ness,"3!7 and the Supreme Court's cases were "replete with examples 
of judgments as to when such fairness has been denied an accused in 
light of all the circumstances."3!8 Moreover, the fact that there is at 
times "no sharply defined standard against which to make these judg­
ments"3!9 was not "a sufficient reason," for Justice Powell, "to deny 
the federal judiciary's power to make them when warranted by the 
308. Id. at 493-94 (brackets in original). 
309. Id. at 494-95 (footnotes omitted)(quoting Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 453 (Roberts, J., 
separate opinion». 
310. 425 U.S. at 495 (Powell, J., concurring in the jUdgment). 
311. Id. 
312. Id. 
313. Id. (footnote omitted). 
314. Id. at 494 n.5 (emphasis added). 
315. Id. (emphasis added). 
316. Id.at494n.6. 
317. Id. 
318. Id. at 494-95 n.6. 
319. Id. at 495 n.6. 
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circumstances."32o And, "[m]uch the same" was "true of analysis" 
under the Court's supervisory power.321 Nor did Justice Powell 
"despair" of the Court's ability "in an appropriate case" to identify 
correct standards for law enforcement practices "without relying on 
the 'chancellor's' 'fastidious squeamishness or private senti­
mentalism.' "322 
In conclusion, Justice Powell "emphasize[d] that the cases, if any, 
in which proof of predisposition is not dispositive will be rare."323 He 
acknowledged that "[p]olice overinvolvement in crime would have to 
reach a demonstrable level of outrageousness before it could bar con­
viction."324 Justice Powell believed that this would prove to be "espe­
cially difficult to show with respect to contraband offenses," which are 
particularly difficult to detect in the absence of undercover govern­
ment operations.325 Moreover, one could not "easily exaggerate the 
problems confronted by law enforcement authorities in dealing effec­
tively with an expanding narcotics traffic,"326 which represented "one 
of the major contributing causes of escalating crime in our cities."327 
Justice Powell felt, therefore, that law enforcement officials "must be 
allowed flexibility adequate to counter effectively such criminal 
activity."328 
Justices Brennan, Stewart, and Marshall dissented in Hampton, 
and, in an opinion by Justice Brennan, espoused the objective test for 
entrapment. 329 In addition, Justice Brennan agreed with Justice Pow­
ell that Russell did not foreclose imposition of either a due process or a 
supervisory powers bar to conviction where police misconduct "is suf­
ficiently offensive,"33o even though a particular defendant "entitled to 
invoke such a defense might be [criminally] 'predisposed.' "331 Justice 
Brennan concluded that conviction should be barred "as a matter of 
law where the subject of the criminal charge is the sale of contraband 
provided to the defendant by a [g]overnment agent."332 
320. Id. 
321. Id. 
322. Id. (quoting Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172). 
323. 425 U.S. at 495 n.7 (Powell, J., concurring in the jUdgment). 
324. Id. 
325. /d. ; 
326. Id. at 495-96 n.7. 
327. Id. at 496 n.7. 
328. Id. 
329. Id. at 496-97 (Brennan, J., dissenting). For analysis of the objective test, see 
supra text accompanying notes 33-43, 105-34. 
330. 425 U.S. at 497 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
331. Id. 
332. Id. at 500 (footnote omitted). 
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Justice Stevens did not participate in the Hampton decision. This 
produced, therefore, a Court division consisting of a plurality of three 
justices, who appeared to have rejected a due process defense for the 
predisposed defendant, irrespective of the degree and kind of govern­
mental misconduct, and a majority of five justices who would seem­
ingly permit a predisposed defendant to invoke the aid of both due 
process and the supervisory powers if the government agents were 
gUilty of "overinvolvement in crime [that had] ... reach[ed] a demon­
strable level of outrageousness...."333 Since Hampton was decided, 
however, Justice Stewart, one of the dissenters who endorsed due pro­
cess and supervisory relief for predisposed defendants, has been re­
placed by Justice O'Connor. Neither Justice O'Connor's views nor 
those of Justice Stevens are known concerning the availability of due 
process and supervisory relief for predisposed defendants who have 
been victimized by governmental misconduct. Therefore, it is uncer­
tain, at present, as to how the Supreme Court would rule if confronted 
with this issue, nor would it be profitable to speculate about or predict 
the outcome if such a case were to come before the Court. However, 
since Justice Stevens, based upon his record, appears to be more of a 
swing voter than Justice O'Connor, his vote might thus prove to be 
crucial to the outcome. Of course, additional changes in the member­
ship of the Court could further complicate the picture and make the 
outcome even more unpredictable. 
4. Applying the Defense 
Although the issue of whether specific governmental conduct is 
violative of due process is one of law,334 the outcome of such an in­
quiry will hinge upon an assessment of "the totality of the circum­
stances[,] with no single factor controlling."335 This inquiry, because 
333. Id. at 495 n.7 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment); see United States v. 
Williams, 705 F.2d 623, 619 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 524 (1983); United States v. 
Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578, 607 (3d Cir.)(en banc), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1106 (1982); United 
States v. Nunez-Rios, 622 F.2d 1093, 1098 (2d Cir. 1980); United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 
373, 378-79 (3d Cir. 1978); United States v. Johnson, 565 F.2d 179, 181 (1st Cir. 1977), 
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1075 (1978); Commonwealth v. Shuman, 391 Mass. 345, 354, 462 
N.E.2d 80, 85 (1984); State v. Hohensee, 650 S.W.2d 268, 271 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); People 
v. Isaacson, 44 N.Y.2d 511, 519-20, 378 N.E.2d 78, 82,406 N.Y.S.2d 714,718 (1978); see 
also United States v. Lomas, 706 F.2d 886, 891 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied sub nom. 
Margolis v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 720 (1984); United States v. Rodriguez-Ramos, 704 
F.2d 17, 22 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3542 (1983); United States v. Brown, 635 
F.2d 1207, 1212 (6th Cir. 1980); United States v. Wylie, 625 F.2d 1371, 1377 (9th Cir. 
1980), cert denied sub nom. Perluss v. United States, 449 U.S. 1080 (1981). 
334. United States v. Ramirez, 710 F.2d 535, 539 (9th Cir. 1983). 
335. United States v. Tobias, 662 F.2d 381, 387 (5th Cir. 1981); State v. Hohensee, 
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of the flexible nature of due process,336 will not lead to a "precise line 
of demarcation or calibrated measuring rod with a mathematical solu­
tion."337 This is not surprising, for what is being sought is nothing less 
than police misconduct which has attained the "demonstrable level of 
outrageousness"338 condemned by the "fundamental and necessarily 
general but pliant postulates"339 of due process. As the Second Circuit 
has observed, "[t]he cases that have sustained due process claims con­
cern [g]overnment conduct that was most egregious and reached the 
level of shocking the conscience. "340 In sum, therefore, a defendant 
who has been victimized by police misconduct "repugnant to the 
American system of criminal justice,"341 and involving government 
participation in, or control of, criminal activity to an unconscionable 
degree,342 may invoke the due process defense of outrageous police 
conduct. 
Certain aspects of the conduct required to satisfy the due process 
criteria have been deemed by the courts to be indicative of law en­
forcement misconduct which violates fundamental fairness. Among 
the factors that may be considered as relevant to a denial of due pro­
cess are (1) the manufacture, creation, and control of crime by govern­
ment agents that substantially and unreasonably exceed the level of 
650 S.W.2d 268, 272 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); see Hampton, 425 U.S. at 492, 494-95 nn.5-6 
(Powell, J., concurring in the jUdgment); People v. Isaacson, 44 N.Y.2d 511, 521, 378 
N.E.2d 78, 83, 406 N.Y.S.2d 714, 719 (1978). 
336. See supra text accompanying notes 71-84. 
337. People v. Isaacson, 44 N.Y.2d 511, 521, 378 N.E.2d 78, 83, 406 N.Y.S.2d 714, 
719 (1978). 
338. Hampton, 425 U.S. at 495 n.7 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment); accord. 
United States v. Beverly, 723 F.2d 11, \3 (3d Cir. 1983)(per curiam); United States v. 
Rodriguez-Ramos, 704 F.2d 17,22 (1st Cir.), cerr. denied, \03 S. Ct. 3542 (1983); United 
States v. Brown, 635 F.2d 1207, 1212 (6th Cir. 1980). 
339. People v. Isaacson, 44 N.Y.2d 511, 521, 378 N.E.2d 78, 83, 406 N.Y.S.2d 714, 
719 (1978). 
340. United States v. Alexandro, 675 F.2d 34, 40 (2d Cir.), cerro denied, 459 U.S. 835 
(1982); see United States V. Williams, 705 F.2d 603, 620 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 
524 (1983); United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578, 608 (3d Cir.)(en banc), cert. denied, 
457 U.S. 1 \06 (1982)("only the most intolerable government conduct" will qualify for the 
due process defense). 
341. United States v. Lomas, 706 F.2d 886,891 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied sub nom. 
Margolis V. United States, 104 S. Ct. 720 (1984); see Russell, 411 U.S. at 432 (law enforce­
ment conduct violatve of "that 'fundamental fairness, shocking to the universal sense of 
justice,' mandated by ... [d]ue [p]rocess")(quoting Kinsella v. United States ex. rei. Sin­
gleton, 361 U.S. 234, 246 (1960»; United States v. Ramirez, 7\0 F.2d 535, 539 (9th Cir. 
1983)(conduct so outrageous as to shock a sense of justice). 
342. See United States V. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373, 375-76, 380-81 (3d Cir. 1978); Greene 
V. United States, 454 F.2d 783, 784-87 (9th Cir. 1971); State v. Hohensee, 650 S.W.2d 268, 
268-70,274 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); People V. Isaacson, 44 N.Y.2d 511, 515-18, 522-23, 378 
N.W.2d 78, 79-81, 83-84, 406 N.Y.S.2d 714, 715-17, 720 (1978). 
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activity necessary to detect and apprehend criminals, or to gain their 
confidence;343 (2) the strength and degree of the causal relationship 
between the governmental misconduct and the criminal activities of 
the defendant;344 (3) persistent and repeated efforts by law enforce­
ment officers to wear down and eventually overcome the defendant's 
reluctance to participate in the proposed criminal activity;345 and (4) a 
predominant motive by the police to induce criminality solely to se­
cure a conviction. 346 Similarly, the type of crime under investigation 
is relevant to the scope of permissible law enforcement conduct.347 
Here, the standard of reasonable involvement by government should 
be measured against the complexity and need for secrecy in preparing 
and executing the particular offense in question. This is because the 
intricacy of the enterprise and the difficulty in penetrating to its core 
will require a more intense police presence. Thus, the more complex 
and clandestine the criminal operation is, the greater will be the justifi­
cation for the extent of government participation, provided that such 
activity does not attain the level of pervasive control and direction. 
Conversely, the less intricate and secretive the offense, the more re­
strictive will be the tolerable scope of law enforcement involvement. 
Ultimately, a court must assess the totality of the circumstances348 to 
determine whether the government has exceeded the bounds of de­
cency and has engaged in conduct that shocks the conscience and of­
fends a sense of justice.349 
Although instances of due process misconduct involving a predis­
343. See United States v. Ramirez, 710 F.2d 535, 539 (9th Cir. 1983)(Iisted as an 
example of the defense by the court); United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373, 380-81 (3d Cir. 
1978); Greene v. United States, 454 F.2d 783, 786-87 (9th Cir. 1971); State v. Hohensee, 
650 S.W.2d 268, 274 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); People v. Isaacson, 44 N.Y.2d 511, 522, 378 
N.E.2d 78, 83, 406 N.Y.S.2d 714, 720 (1978); see also United States v. Brown, 635 F.2d 
1207, 1213 (6th Cir. 1980)(implicit1y recognizing such overinvolvement as an example of 
the defense). 
344. United States v. Brown, 635 F.2d 1207, 1213 (6th Cir. 1980). 
345. People v. Isaacson, 44 N.Y.2d 511, 521, 522, 378 N.E.2d 78, 83, 84, 406 
N.Y.S.2d 714, 719, 720 (1978). 
346. See United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373, 381 (3d Cir. 1978); People v. Isaac­
son, 44 N.Y.2d 511, 522, 378 N.E.2d 78,84,406 N.Y.S.2d 714, 720 (1978); see also Greene 
v. United States, 454 F.2d 783, 786-87 (9th Cir. 1971). The government may rebut a claim 
of improper motive by evidence demonstrating that its investigation of the defendant was 
reasonable and free of improper motive, even though such evidence might amount to inad­
missible hearsay if it were offered to prove the truth of the matters asserted. See United 
States v. Hunt, 36 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 2203, 2203 (4th Cir. Nov. 28, 1984). 
347. United States v. Brown, 635 F.2d 1207, 1213 (6th Cir. 1980). 
348. See Greene v. United States, 454 F.2d 783, 786-87 (9th Cir. 1971). 
349. See Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172-74; People v. Isaacson, 44 N.Y.2d 511, 522, 378 
N.E.2d 78, 84, 406 N.Y.S.2d 714, 720 (1978). 
45 1984] ENTRAPMENT 
posed defendant "will be rare,"350 such cases do exist. Moreover, as a 
review of these cases will demonstrate, merely "prosecuting the police 
under the applicable provisions of state or federal law" for "engag[ing] 
in illegal activity in concert with a defendant beyond the scope of their 
duties,"351 as Justice Rehnquist has urged, is simply not an adequate 
remedy; for what is at stake is not only the vindication of constitu­
tional guarantees but also the very preservation of judicial integrity 
itself. To state the proposition in its starkest terms, the courts must 
close their doors to "such prostitution of the criminallaw"352 as an act 
of self-preservation. What is called for is a judicial pledge of allegiance 
to "the purity of [the court's] own temple"353 and to the preservation 
of the Constitution.354 "[P]rosecuting the police" will not fulfill these 
goals, and will be irrelevant to the preservation of judicial integrity. 
In Greene v. United States,355 a prosecution for the illegal manu­
facture of alcohol, the facts revealed that an undercover agent reestab­
lished contact with the defendants after having been instrumental in 
causing their previous arrest on bootlegging charges.356 The agent 
then pressured the defendants to establish a new liquor operation, and 
for over two years was deeply involved in the defendants' illicit activi­
ties. 357 These included offering to supply materials, an operator, and a 
location for the still, as well as actually supplying two thousand 
pounds of sugar at wholesale prices. 358 Throughout this extended pe­
riod of operations, the government, through its undercover agent, was 
the sole purchaser of all the liquor that the defendants produced at the 
still.359 
The Ninth Circuit, on appeal from the defendants' convictions, 
rejected the defense of entrapment, in that the defendants had been 
predisposed to sell bootleg whiskey from the time that the agent had 
first contacted them.360 However, it reversed and ordered dismissal of 
charges, because the government had so enmeshed itself in criminal 
activity, "from beginning to end," that a conviction under these cir­
350. Hampton, 425 U.S. at 495 n.7 (Powell, J., concurring in the jUdgment). 
351. [d. at 490 (plurality opinion). 
352. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 457 (Roberts, J., separate opinion). 
353. /d. 
354. Cj. United States v. Beverly, 723 F.2d II, 13 (3d Cir. 1983)(per curiam)(due 
process misconduct "compel[s] acquittal so as to protect the Constitution"). 
355. 454 F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1971). 
356. [d. at 784. 
357. [d. at 785. 
358. [d. at 785-86. 
359. [d. at 786. 
360. [d. 
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cumstances was "repugnant to American criminal justice. "361 
Therefore, although the Ninth Circuit, in Greene, did not explicitly 
invoke the principles of due process as the ground for reversal, the 
concept of fundamental fairness under due process was clearly the ba­
sis of the court's decision. 
Similarly, in United States v. Twigg,362 the Third Circuit found 
government involvement in the illegal manufacture of drugs so perva­
sive and outrageous as to offend due process. 363 Here, government 
agents, acting through an informant who was himself a convicted felon 
desirous of reducing the severity of his sentence, suggested to the de­
fendants the establishment of a drug factory, provided all necessary 
equipment and expertise, as well as the location for the factory, and 
performed the lion's share of the manufacturing. 364 By contrast, the 
defendants' involvement in the illicit operation was minimal, and then 
only at the specific direction of the informant. 365 
Although entrapment was not available to the defendants because 
of their predisposition,366 the court found the due process argument of 
the defendant, Nevill, "persuasive,"367 for the government had en­
gaged in the "egregious conduct" of "generat[ing] new crimes by the 
defendant [Neville] merely for the sake of pressing criminal charges 
against him when, as far as the record reveals, he was lawfully and 
peacefully minding his own affairs. "368 As the court viewed the situa­
tion, "[fJundamental fairness [WOUld] not permit [it] to countenance 
such actions by law enforcement officials...."369 Accordingly, 
"prosecution for a crime so fomented by [government agents would] 
be barred."370 
In State v. Hohensee,371 the defendant was convicted of a burglary 
which was "sponsored," manufactured, and directed by the Spring­
361. Id. at 787. 
362. 588 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1978). 
363. Id. at 380-81. 
364. Id. at 375-76, 380-81. 
365. Id. at 376, 381. 
366. Id. at 376. 
367. /d. at 377. 
368. Id. at 381. 
369. Id. 
370. Id. (footnote omitted). The continued vitality of Twigg has been questioned. 
See United States v. Beverly, 723 F.2d II, 12 (3d Cir. 1983)(per curiam); United States v. 
Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578, 610 n.17 (3d Cir.)(en bane), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1106 (1982)("In 
this day of heightened criminal activity, the federal judiciary must be cautious not to exer­
cise a 'veto' - especially . . . a constitutional veto - 'over law enforcement practices of 
which it [does) not approve.''' (quoting Russell, 411 U.S. at 435)(brackets in the original». 
371. 650 S.W.2d 268 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982). 
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field, Missouri, Police Department.372 To perpetrate the burglary, the 
police made a " 'deal' " with two convicted felons, who, in return for 
leniency on another burglary charge, agreed to supply information to 
the police concerning burglaries in Springfield.373 For this, the infor­
mants were being paid weekly salaries by the police, who kept them 
under close supervision. 374 
One of the informants had been acquainted with the defendant 
for approximately seven years, during which burglary had been "their 
principal topic of conversation."375 Contact was made with the de­
fendant, and the two informants, Officer Roberts of the Springfield Po­
lice Department, who was acting in an undercover capacity, and the 
defendant met at a house that had been rented pursuant to an under­
cover operation known as " 'Operation Rosebud.' "376 The purpose of 
this conference was to discuss the burglary of "the Brandhorst 
building."377 
Since the defendant was familiar with the interior of the building, 
he was able to draw a floor plan which included the location of a par­
ticular safe that was the object of the break-in.378 Using separate vehi­
cles, the four individuals proceeded to the "target area ...."379 The 
defendant drove his own vehicle, while the two informants and Officer 
Roberts traveled in a separate" 'Ford van.' "380 The defendant drove 
into a parking lot, "approximately 150 yards from the Brandhorst 
building," and remained there as a 100kout.381 Meanwhile, the two 
informants broke into the building and removed the safe. 382 Officer 
Roberts, who had remained outside, helped the informants load the 
safe into the van. 383 The three of them "then drove past the lookout 
position of the defendant, who followed them to the undercover 
house."384 
On appeal, the defendant claimed that his conviction of burglary 
372. See id. at 268-70. 
373. [d. at 269. 
374. [d. 
375. [d. 
376. [d. at 269, 270. 
377. [d. at 269. The subsequent break-in of this building, which formed the basis of 
the prosecution of the defendant, was accomplished without the prior consent or knowl­
edge of the owner. [d. at 268-69. 
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should be invalidated on due process grounds, because he had been 
victimized by the misconduct of the police and their agents. 385 After 
thoroughly reviewing the relevant case authorities,386 the Missouri 
Court of Appeals, in Hohensee, concluded that the overreaching in­
volvement of the law enforcement officials in the burglary of the 
Brandhorst building was sufficiently outrageous to offend principles of 
due process. 387 The court therefore reversed the defendants' 
conviction.388 
Characterizing the defendant's involvement, primarily as a look­
out, in the criminal enterprise as "no more of a threat to society than 
that of a stargazer, similarly situated, contemplating Polaris,"389 the 
court found it "difficult to conceive a situation where the government's 
involvement could be greater or the defendant's could be less, and the 
conduct of the latter still be a likely subject for prosecution."39o Thus, 
the court reasoned that the break-in was accomplished by the govern­
ment agents without benefit of the defendant's presence, and his con­
duct, standing alone, would not have been illegal if the agents had not 
engaged in their illegal acts.391 In addition, the court noted that there 
was no evidence that the burglary "was part of ongoing criminal activ­
ities engaged in by defendant prior to his involvement with Officer 
Roberts and the two salaried felons."392 
In a strong concurring opinion, Chief Judge Greene observed that 
what the government had concocted here was nothing less than a man­
ufactured crime, "aided and abetted by two habitual criminals" hired 
by the police for such purpose, "in hopes of getting evidence to show 
that the defendant, by acting as a supposed lookout, was also guilty of 
385. Id. The defendant, because of his predisposition, made no claim of entrapment. 
Id. at 270 & n.2. 
386. Id. at 270-74. 





392. Id. The defendant had also been convicted of conspiring to burglarize a speci­
fied residence. Here, however, the court upheld the conviction and rejected the defendant's 
argument that there could be no conspiracy where the alleged co-conspirators were either 
law enforcement officers or their agents who lacked the requisite criminal intent. Under 
the applicable statute, the prosecution was required to prove only that the defendant, with 
the purpose of promoting or facilitating that burglary, did agree with Officer Roberts and 
the two paid informants that they, or one or more of them, would burglarize the residence. 
Id. at 276. This was the gist of the defendant's agreement, and, to the court, the fact that 
the other three co-conspirators lacked the criminal intent to commit the burglary was "of 
no moment." Id. 
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the crime."393 For Chief Judge Greene, if such conduct received the 
sanction of the courts, it was "difficult to imagine under what circum­
stances they would ever say to the police, 'You have gone too far.' "394 
Moreover, Chief Judge Greene condemned the police misconduct 
in Hohensee for breeding disrespect for law enforcement officers, erod­
ing public confidence in the criminal justice system, and, "if con­
doned," resulting in ''police excesses that cannot be tolerated in a 
democracy. "395 Although he acknowledged that most law enforce­
ment excesses were undoubtedly "motivated by frustration over the 
inability of the police to completely satisfy the demands of the public 
to 'get the criminals off the streets,' "396 Chief Judge Greene neverthe­
less concluded that this inability could not "justify breaking the law by 
those who are sworn to uphold it."397 
Finally, in People v. /saacson,398 the New York Court of Appeals 
condemned police misconduct that originated with the arrest of a 
third person for possession of a controlled substance and who was sub­
sequently physically abused during interrogation by police officers.399 
Later, when the officers learned that the substance was not a con­
trolled one, they kept this information from him until after his services 
as an informant had ended.400 Instead, he was kept under the delusion 
that he was facing a substantial period of incarceration if convicted. 
He thus agreed, upon advice of counsel, to be an informant for the 
police.401 
The informant proceeded to contact various individuals, includ­
ing the defendant, in order to set up drug deals for which the police 
could arrest the sellers.402 The defendant, a resident of Pennsylvania 
with no prior record, initially refused the informant's pleas to help him 
"make money to hire a decent lawyer" in order to fight the criminal 
charges facing him.403 After persistent entreaties by the informant, 
however, the defendant finally agreed to sell cocaine to the informant 
in a quantity suggested by the police so they could obtain a conviction 
393. [d. (Green, c.J., concurring). 
394. [d. 
395. [d. (emphasis added). 
396. [d. 
397. [d. 
398. 44 N.Y.2d 511, 378 N.E.2d 78, 406 N.Y.S.2d 714 (1978). 
399. [d. at 515, 378 N.E.2d at 79, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 715. 
400. [d. 
401. [d. at SIS, 378 N.E.2d at 79, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 715-16. 
402. [d. at 516, 378 N.E.2d at 80, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 716. 
403. [d. 
50 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:1 
under New York law for a higher grade of crime.404 The police also 
used the informant to lure the defendant into New York for the sale, 
although the defendant feared New York's drug laws and did not want 
the sale to take place there.405 Finally, the informant suceeded in get­
ting the defendant to cross the state line into New York and to con­
summate the deal, even though the defendant thought that the place 
selected for the sale was in Pennsylvania.406 At the meeting place, the 
defendant was arrested in the course of the transaction.407 
The New York Court of Appeals reversed the defendant's convic­
tion and ordered the dismissal of the indictment for conduct so egre­
gious as to violate due process standards of fairness.408 The court was 
compelled to this result by the cumulative effect of "the manufacture 
and creation of crime,"409 the "deceptive, dishonest[,] and improper" 
practices employed by the police to intimidate and trick the informant, 
and thereby the defendant indirectly, into the commission of a crimi­
nal offense,410 the persistent effort to overcome the defendant's reluc­
tance to commit the offense,411 and "the overriding police desire for a 
conviction of any individual."412 What struck the court as particu­
larly offensive was the "incredible geographical shell game - a deceit 
which effected defendant's unknowing and unintended passage across 
the border into this State."413 In short, the police were not motivated 
by "any desire to prevent crime by cutting off the source" of illicit 
drugs,414 and sought only a conviction that would become "little more 
than a statistic."415 
Thus, the case revealed in its totality "the ugliness of police bru­
tality,"416 compounded by deceit and persistent inducement, "to sat­
isfy the police thirst for a conviction" in brazen disregard of 
fundamental fairness and rights.417 In conclusion, the court brushed 
aside the defendant's predisposition because the proper focus of in­
quiry was on whether the concept of fundamental fairness mandated 
404. Id. at 516-17, 378 N.E.2d at 80, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 716. 
405. Id. at 517, 378 N.E.2d at 80-81, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 716-17. 
406. Id. at 517-18,378 N.E.2d at 81, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 717. 
407. Id. at 518, 378 N.E.2d at 81, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 717. 
408. Id. at 518-20, 378 N.E.2d at 81-82, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 717-18. 
409. Id. at 522, 378 N.E.2d at 83, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 720. 
410. Id. at 522, 378 N.E.2d at 84, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 720. 
411. Id. 
412. Id. 
413. Id. at 522-23, 378 N.E.2d at 84, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 720. 
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dismissal418 The court declared that the proper administration of jus­
tice required, as a matter of due process,419 that "this prosecution 
should be barred. "420 
The Isaacson court emphasized, however, that it was not limiting 
its due process analysis to situations involving police brutality. While 
this type of conduct would justify the barring of prosecution, it did not 
define the limits of the inquiry or the scope of due process relief. 421 
The court implicitly recognized that due process was too flexible a 
concept to fit neatly into a factual frame defined by "precise line[s] of 
demarcation or calibrated measuring rod[s] ...."422 Therefore, in 
order "[t]o prevent improper and unwarranted police solicitation of 
crime,"423 courts must apply the "fundamental and necessarily general 
but pliant postulates" of due process analysis to the peculiar factual 
circumstances of each instance "in which a deprivation is as­
serted...."424 Implicit in this position is the recognition that such 
an approach is most adaptable to providing the broad protection 
against outrageous police practices that only due process standards of 
fundamental fairness can guarantee. 
The common thread running through these cases is the pervasive, 
overreaching involvement of government and its agents in the manu­
facture, direction, and control of crime for purposes of prosecution. 
Government has a duty to prevent crime, not create crime, to appre­
hend criminals, not become a crimina1.425 One has no quarrel with the 
proposition that government may employ "deceit,"426 "[a]rtifice[,] and 
stratagem,"427 set "traps,"428 and use "decoys[] and deception"429 to 
ensnare criminals. Criminal activity, by its very nature, will fre­
quently take place in secret and prove difficult to detect. To effectively 
418. [d. at 524, 378 N.E.2d at 85, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 721. 
419. See id. at 525, 378 N.E.2d at 85, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 721. 
420. [d. at 525, 378 N.E.2d at 85, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 722. 
421. See id. at 520-21, 378 N.E.2d at 83,406 N.Y.S.2d at 719. 
422. [d. at 521, 378 N.E.2d at 83, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 719. 
423. [d. at 520-21, 378 N.E.2d at 83,406 N.Y.S.2d at 719. 
424. [d. at 521, 378 N.E.2d at 83, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 719. 
425. See Sherman, 356 U.S. at 372 (majority opinion), and id. at 384 (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring in the result); Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 469-70 (Holmes, I., dissenting); see also id. 
at 483-85 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Casey, 276 U.S. at 423 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); 
Archer, 486 F.2d at 676-77 (dictum). 
426. Russell, 411 U.S. at 436. 
427. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 441; accord. id. at 453-54 (Roberts, J. separate opinion); see 
Commonwealth v. Shuman, 391 Mass. 345, 351,462 N.E.2d 80,83 (1984); W. LAFAVE & 
A. SCOrf, supra note 21, § 48, at 369. 
428. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 453 (Roberts, J., separate opinion). 
429. [d. at 453-54. 
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counter it, law enforcement agencies must resort to "stealth and strat­
egy" as "necessary weapons in [their] arsenal. ..."430 Thus, as we 
have seen,431 it is proper for government agents, in particular those 
engaged in undercover operations, to provide the opportunity, or fur­
nish the facilities, for the commission of crime. But, while facilitating 
the commission of criminal activity, or even partially assisting in its 
execution, may be permissible, manufacturing crime is not. Peripheral 
involvement in crime is one thing; creation, direction, and control are 
another. 
When government goes beyond the mere facilitation of crime, 
when it exceeds the use of traps, decoys, deceit, and deception, when it 
instigates or induces citizens, whether predisposed to the commission 
of crime or not, when its involvement in crime becomes more than 
peripheral, when its activity reaches the level of creation, direction, 
and control, then "enough is more than enough - it is just too 
much."432 At this point, crime has become "the product of the crea­
tive activity" of government,433 and not of the criminal classes. It is 
then time for the courts to step in and bar their doors to the prosecu­
tion of citizens for such manufactured and orchestrated "crimes." 
And, it is here that the need for due process protection is compelling. 
Both the SUbjective and objective tests for entrapment provide 
only partial, and inadequate, relief. First, the statutory premise of the 
SUbjective approach to entrapment deprives the doctrine of a constitu­
tional footing and exposes it to modification by legislative fiat. 434 Sec­
ond, under the SUbjective analysis, criminal predisposition is fatal to a 
claim of entrapment.435 Similarly, the objective test for entrapment, 
while extending protection to the predisposed defendant,436 lacks a 
constitutional basis.437 Thus, it is simply doctrinally and normatively 
430. Sherman, 356 U.S. at 372. 
431. See supra text accompanying notes 176-77. 
432. Williamson v. United States, 311 F.2d 441, 445 (5th CiT. 1962)(Brown, J., con­
curring specially); see Gershman, Entrapment, Shocked Consciences, and the Staged Arrest, 
66 MINN. L. REV. 567, 620, 629-31 (1982). 
433. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 451; accord, Sherman, 356 U.S. at 372. 
434. See Russell, 411 U.S. at 433. 
435. See supra text accompanying notes 22-25. 
436. See supra text accompanying notes 33-40, 105-34. 
437. See Russell, 411 U.S. at 432-33; supra text accompanying notes 135-37; see also 
Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 456 (Roberts, J.,separate opinion)(the defendant "has no rights or 
equities by reason of his entrapment" (emphasis added»; Note, supra note 22, at 1456-57; 
cf. Sherman, 356 U.S. at 380, 385 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the result)(placing the 
objective analysis on both a supervisory-power and judicial-integrity footing); Sorrells, 287 
U.S. at 455, 457, 459 (Roberts, J., separate opinion)(same, except that implicitly as to su­
pervisory-power basis). 
53 1984] ENTRAPMENT 
inadequate to establish national standards of decency and fairness 
against which to measure the reasonableness of police practices in the 
enforcement of the criminal laws. The ultimate drawback, however, 
to invoking the protection of entrapment principles against outrageous 
"[p]olice overinvolvement in crime,"438 arises from the limiting scope 
of the doctrine which does not extend to conduct that shocks the con­
science and offends notions of decency and fair play.439 Hence, the 
need for a due process defense. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
We return, then, to the central theme of this article. The issue of 
police misconduct in the enforcement of the criminal law is not an 
issue of law enforcement, it is an argument about government. As this 
article has endeavored to show, the manufacture of crime is not the 
legitimate business of government.440 Neither is it the proper function 
of government to prey upon its citizens by instigating or inducing 
them to crime.441 In our zeal to combat crime, we must not permit the 
government to become the ultimate lawbreaker. In the words of Jus­
tice Brandeis: 
Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect lib­
erty when the [g]ovemment's purposes are beneficent. Men born to 
freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil­
minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious en­
croachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without 
understanding.442 
While the apprehension and prosecution of criminals are desira­
ble ends,443 they do not justify "foul means ...."444 It is, therefore, 
the inherent duty of courts to "preserve the purity"445 of their "own 
temple[s]446 by refusing to have a hand in "such dirty business"447 that 
is repugnant to due process standards of fundamental fairness. Thus, 
it is both the legal and moral duty of government in a democratic 
438. Hampton, 425 U.S. at 495 n.7 (Powell, J., concurring in the jUdgment). 
439. See supra text accompanying notes 216-17. 
440. See Sherman, 356 U.S. at 372 (majority opinion), and id. at 384 (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring in the result). 
441. See Archer, 486 F.2d at 676-77 (dictum). 
442. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 479 (Brandeis, J., dissenting)(footnote omitted) (empha­
sis added). 
443. See id. at 470 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
444. Casey, 276 U.S. at 423 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
445. [d. at 425. 
446. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 457 (Roberts, J., separate opinion). 
447. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 470 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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society to enforce its criminal laws pursuant to a sense of fair play and 
within the limits of civilized standards of decency. 
